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Abstract 
 
As the focus on reducing CO2 emissions increases and the global demand of energy is rising, 
the oil and gas industry faces competition from other sources of energy. To take competitive 
advantage with competing energy suppliers, technology and innovation may be an important 
factor to ensure commercial viability for the oil and gas sector.  
The thesis explores selection principles GE Oil and Gas use to consider innovation 
initiatives. In a qualitative, three embedded case I analyse institutional factors and innovation 
factors that affect the selection of innovation initiatives. Furthermore, I use interviews, 
observations and documents to understand how these selection principles can facilitate radical 
innovations solving the major challenges facing the oil and gas industry. 
GE Oil and Gas is a supplier to the oil and gas industry and they collaborate with 
customers and stakeholders in the selection of innovation initiatives. GE Oil and Gas interact 
with customers and stakeholders on three levels of which they enjoy an informal relationship 
strongly affecting how they select innovation initiatives. Furthermore, the analysis implicates 
that formal institutional factors on all three levels strongly affect the potential to succeed with 
radical innovation initiatives at GE Oil and Gas. The analysis reveals that companies who fails 
to succeed with radical innovation initiatives at times where innovation factors are not the main 
challenge to innovation selection, can facilitate successful radical innovations by improving 
their formal selection principles. Improvement occurs by strengthening formal principles 
through the allocation of resources (time, personnel and money), removing time-consuming 
bottlenecks for innovation and setting the priorities to select and succeed with radical 
innovations. Finally, the thesis implicates that implementing these measures will enhance the 
unqiue position of GE Oil and Gas to develop radical technology solving some of the challenges 
facing the oil and gas industry.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Over the past decades, the literature within the field of innovation management (Reid and De 
Brentani, 2004: 1) and neo institutionalism  (Powell and Colyvas, 2008) have provided tools to 
increase knowledge on how to manage the early phase of innovation. This master thesis aims 
to contribute to this theory by examining institutional factors and innovation challenges that 
affect innovation selection at GE Oil and Gas, a systems supplier and original equipment 
manufacturer (OEM) to the oil and gas industry. This thesis analyses institutional factors on 
three levels; intra-organizational1, inter-organizational and macro institutional2. It aims to gain 
insight to how this company can develop selection principles to facilitate radical innovations3. 
Radical innovations emerge from technological breakthrough and can lead to the introduction 
of a new-to-the-world machinery (Verspagen, 2005: 493) (Edquist, 2005: 8).  
Suppliers to the oil and gas industry are facing multiple challenges: Oil and gas 
reservoirs are located in particular harsh environments and in extremely remote parts of the 
world. In addition, oil and gas extraction is expanding to geographical areas experiencing high 
political instability subduing a potential risk for future return on investment (ROI) (Talseth, 
2014). The new global context sets a strain on the industry to reduce costs while facing massive 
technical challenges to oil and gas exploration.  
The global energy demand is expected to rise by more than 50% before 2030 (Birol, 
2013) and competing sources of energy have a potential of becoming more important suppliers 
in the future energy landscape. Not only must the oil and gas industry develop technology which 
gains access to deeper and more remote oil and gas reservoirs, but there is a demand for 
sustainable technology reducing greenhouse gas emissions during exploration of oil and gas 
(Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, No date). Consequently, global warming is becoming a vast 
challenge that the industry has to cope with in order to continue as a global energy supplier in 
the future energy landscape (Ministry of Climate and Environment, 2011-2012). It is a global 
problem, whereas existing emissions are claimed to derive from industrialized countries and 
future emissions are expected to emanate from developing countries and emerging economies. 
In the new energy landscape, OEM’s may increase their presence in developing countries and 
                                                 
1 Or company level. 
2 Or governmental level. 
3 See the definition of radical innovations in chapter 2.1 for more information. 
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emerging economies where institutional factors are seen as severe and unpredictable (Miller 
and Lessard, 2000: 82) (PETROPOL, 2006: 6)  
Companies take on innovation to achieve commercial growth and the prospect of ROI 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982), but this thesis emphasizes that challenges to innovation selection 
cannot be overcome by purely looking at economic variables (Reid and De Brentani, 2004: 1). 
This thesis examines how institutional factors affect innovation selection, and how this 
knowledge can counter the selection of less profitable innovation initiatives. Furthermore, it 
analyses how an increased number of radical innovations can be facilitated. Radical technology 
and innovation offer possible solutions to solve some of the challenges facing the oil and gas 
industry (Wiencke, 2014). 
The oil and gas industry is facing a changing energy landscape4 where radical 
innovations may determine which organizations that will enter the new landscape and which 
will be locked out. Therefore, the researcher raise the following research questions: 
 
1. What affects the selection of innovation initiatives at GE Oil and Gas, and how can 
these selection principles facilitate radical innovations? 
Proposition: Institutional factors will strongly affect the selection of innovations in GE Oil 
and Gas 
 
2. How can GE Oil and Gas increase the potential to succeed with radical innovations? 
1.1 Introduction to GE 
The history of General Electric Company goes back to 1876, when Thomas Edison opened a 
laboratory in Menlo Park, New Jersey. From his laboratory, Thomas Edison developed the first 
glowing electric light bulb - a radical innovation as the first of its kind (General Electric, 2014: 
b). During the same period, another electrical innovation company led by Charles Coffin 
emerged as a vast competitor to Thomas Edison’s newly established company. The two 
companies merged into The General Electric Company (GE) in 1892 and pursued to follow the 
former success criteria of both companies: The acquisition of promising technology companies 
                                                 
4 In the new landscape, technology development has taken a new direction in terms of design, solutions and 
problems. The paradigm is dominated by the mind-set of leading scientists (Verspagen 2005: 497). 
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based on Coffins expertise, and the introduction of radical innovations provided by Edison’s 
personal skills and characteristics (General Electric, 2014: a). Both criteria has been 
distinguishing features to describe GE’s growth and corporate development into the current 
organization with 300.000 employees operating in more than 140 countries worldwide GE’s 
current organization structure with nine business units as presented in the appendix was 
introduced in 2012 (General Electric, 2014: c). It involved restructuring the old business unit 
“GE Energy” into three distinct business units: Oil & Gas, Power & Water and Energy 
Management. The reorganization was needed to simplify communication of GE as one single 
entity towards customers, stakeholders and the public (Offshore Wind, 2012). In the 
organization chart, GE Global Research (GRC) is shown as a staff unit on corporate level, 
serving all business units. Since the early days, developing new technology for industrial 
purposes has been a priority for GE, and the company opened its own internal research facility 
in 1900. Today, GE has seven internal research facilities that have introduced a number of 
radical innovations substantially changing business (Albeniz, 2013). 
The oil and gas business unit to GE is a recent development starting with the acquisition 
of the Italian company Nuovo Pignone that manufactures turbines and compressors in 1994. 
GE’s transition to a full scale Oil and Gas equipment supplier continued in 2007 when it 
acquired Vetco Gray, a drilling and subsea equipment. In the following years of 2010-2013, 
GE acquired several companies emerging into a full-scale supplier of advanced technical 
equipment to oil and gas companies (Kranz, 2013).  
1.2 Composition of the thesis 
Literature from innovation management aims to present why companies should select radical 
innovations, it presents challenges to facilitate radical innovations and suggestions to how 
companies can select radical innovations. Furthermore, the reader is introduced to the 
theoretical proposition that institutional factors, formal and informal, on three levels can affect 
how companies select innovations and how these factors may affect future ROI if the company 
succeeds in executing them. 
The methodology chapter provides detailed and informative reflections of research 
design, research techniques and the researcher’s personal experiences from data collection 
enhancing the quality of the thesis. In chapter 5-8, the three embedded case studies are 
contextualized, described and analysed. Each section ends with a summary presenting main 
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implications from the analysis. The final chapter summarizes main findings and redeems 
answers to the research questions. In addition, the to implications for further research.   
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2 Concepts 
 
Chapter two defines and explains innovation and institutional factors. They are key concepts to 
understand the research questions and the strands of literature this thesis aims to contribute. The 
explanation emphasizes how each concept can be analysed in a qualitative case study. 
2.1 Innovation 
Innovation can be defined as a new product, the exploitation of new markets, new service or a 
new production process (Edquist, 2005: 6-7) which is operationalized through a technological 
development project. Innovation can be divided into radical and incremental classified from the 
type of technology applied to develop the project. Although incremental technology is 
considered as crucial for commercial growth (Fagerberg, 2005),this thesis focuses upon radical 
innovations and therefore emphasizes to elaborate this concept. Still, incremental technology 
will be defined to shed light on how the two types of innovation differ.   
2.2 How radical and incremental innovation differ 
Incremental innovation is activity close to the core competence and knowledge base of the 
organization in question (Nagji and Tuff, 2012: 68), and exploits internal knowledge to develop 
new solutions by utilizing existing and familiar technology (Levinthal and March, 1981) 
(Garcia and Calantone, 2002: 125- 126). Incremental innovation is normally recognized in the 
form of continuous development, often resulting in product refinements on a day-to-day basis. 
While these refinements have a tremendous impact on the productivity of the organization, 
underlining their importance, one refinement does not have a dramatic effect on the society as 
a whole (Freeman and Perez 1988: 45-46). This is an important difference between incremental 
and radical innovations.  
Radical innovations are defined as “new to the world solutions” (Nagji and Tuff 2012: 
68) and therefore have a potential of influencing the infrastructure in the geographical area 
where they are introduced. The term radical in this context refers to how radical the innovation 
is compared to current technology (Fagerberg 2005: 7), and consists of activities designed to 
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create completely new products, processes or services, or to serve new markets and customer 
needs (Freeman and Perez 1988: 45-46). Furthermore, radical technology offers new benefits 
to customers and differs substantially from the existing technology path a company or an 
industry is following (Chandy and Tellis, 1998). Company collaboration or inter-company 
learning can therefore be crucial for developing successful radical innovations because it opens 
for external knowledge flows (Bao et al., 2012: 1230). In a supplier-customer relationship, 
radical innovations are more likely to emerge from intimate and prolonged interaction between 
collaboration partners (Powell and Grodal, 2005: 65).  
Radical innovations appear to be a broad concept with many characteristics. The 
following section intends to create a division of radical innovations into two types of projects, 
and then describe how they distinguish from one another. 
2.2.1 Radical innovations in the current technological landscape 
The customers usually requests radical innovations within the current technological landscape 
because they are familiar with the products and current technology.  Consequently, this is 
referred to as market pull since it is easier for them to identify their problem and express their 
preferences (Tidd and Bessant, 2009: 390). The introduction of the innovation itself can cause 
signiﬁcant changes to how the oil and gas industry conduct business. The innovation, however, 
does not involve a new market infrastructure. These innovations are “big bets” or key strategic 
commitments with a longer investment perspective than incremental innovations (Tidd and 
Bessant 2009: 326). These types of innovation projects are of relevance for drilling in deep 
waters and gaining access to reservoirs in a harsher climate, like the Arctic for instance. Finally, 
the innovation would be the ﬁrst of its kind and completely new to the market in question 
(Garcia and Calantone, 2002: 123) 
2.2.2 Radical innovation in a new technological landscape 
Radical innovation in a new technological landscape differs in substantial areas from radical 
innovations in the current technological landscape. This type of radical innovation projects 
embodies a new technology that results in a new market infrastructure. The innovation project 
does not address a recognized demand but instead creates a demand unknown to the customer 
(Garcia and Calatone 2002: 120-121). There are many needs that the customer may be unaware 
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of, and in these circumstances, the balance shifts to a technology-push strategy (Tidd and 
Bessant 2009). For instance on a customer collaboration project, if the supplier suggests 
development of a radical innovation projects consisting of technology from another sector, this 
could qualify as a radical innovation in a new technological landscape. Besides technological 
capabilities, when a radical innovation project is introduced into the market it usually require a 
new set of organizational capabilities (Garcia and Calantone 2002). To facilitate and increase 
the potential to succeed with these innovation initatives, working with stakeholders or 
customers can be paramount to reduce risk and to ensure future ROI (Tidd and Bessant 2009: 
327-330). 
2.3 Institutional factors 
In this framework, an institution consist of formal and informal structures and activities that 
provide stability and meaning to social behavior. Institutions operate at multiple levels of 
jurisdiction (Scott, 2004: 8). Edquist defines institutions as the rules of the game (Edquist, 2005: 
182), and they are essential to regulate the relations and interactions that arise from 
collaboration. Institutional factors can be a formal regulatory structure or a routine constructed 
by the state or the empowered entity in question. Also, an institutional factor can be an informal 
normative structure (Scott 2004: 8) laid down by the values or the moral commitments within 
an intra-organizational, inter-organizational or governmental level of society (Strang and Sine, 
2002: 4). Therefore, a formal institutional factor is defined in this paper as a written rule that 
regulates the formal and informal relation and interaction between organizations, actors or 
individuals. An informal institutional factor is a norm regulating how people behave and is not 
written down in text. 
A formal institutional factor can be understood as an institution of law and bureaucracy 
(March and Olsen, 1984: 734), and will be measured as explicit knowledge codified as written 
text in paper, document or in a database. An informal institutional factor can be understood in 
terms of informal ties between individuals, among corporations or amongst governmental 
entities. These ties arises when individuals, organizations or governments direct flows of 
information and resources within a social structure (Scott 2004). They will be measured through 
perceptions that individuals express in interviews or under observations. Institutions are subject 
to individual interpretations, and one may encounter that employees, companies or governments 
practice institutional factors differently.  
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3 Theoretical Framework 
 
The theoretical chapter presents major challenges to innovation selection based on literature 
from innovation management. Innovation selection can be problematic and associated to high 
risk. Therefore, the chapter describes selection principles utilized by commercial companies to 
facilitate radical innovations. Then, the chapter will introduce theory that underscores how 
institutional factors on three levels can counter the major innovation challenges and why a 
company should select radical innovations. The chapter aims to outline a framework explaining 
how a company can enable the selection of radical innovation initatives and increase their 
potential to succeed. 
3.1 Historical background to innovation selection 
The academic history of innovation selection goes back to the linear model of innovation 
introduced by Vannevar Bush in 1945. His understanding of how science and technology had 
an impact on the economy became the most influential theoretical framework to understand 
innovation and technology development. His model explained innovation in four steps:  
Basic research → Applied research → Development → (Production and) Diffusion (Godin, 
2006: 639).  
 
 The “Innovation Funnel” (the Funnel) presented in Figure 1 separates the innovation 
process into phases. The first phase begins with the search of new ideas and it moves across 
four phases and into the execution phase where the innovation is introduced into the market 
(Tidd and Bodley, 2002). Innovation selection concerns the second phase of the Funnel.  
1. Search 2. Select
3. 
Implement
4. Launch
Figure 1:  Innovation Funnel (Tidd and Bessant 2009: 64). 
9 
 
Traditionally, innovation was described as a closed process where successful innovation 
implied complete control of how the innovation initiatives came into life, who participated in 
the process and what kind of outcome that was desirable. Companies performed all steps in the 
linear process themselves with innovation starting at their in-house research facility (Powell et 
al., 1996: 1). Inevitably, all steps of the selection process were performed within the internal 
environment of the organization, making it easy to control and to measure through formal rules. 
At the time, large research-based companies did most of the research in their respective 
industries, and they were successful earning most of the profits (Chesbrough, 2003: xvii-xv). 
Successful innovations were measured in terms of ROI, and innovation projects that never 
reached the market, or failed after being introduced into the market, were never really looked 
into. The closed model of innovation worked well during the 20th century. Commercial 
companies from a wide range of sectors, including telecommunications, microelectronics, 
weapons and biotechnology, introduced several radical innovations solving major social 
problems in the market (Freeman and Perez 1988: 54-57).   
By the end of the 20th century, radical innovations made it easier, faster and less costly 
to interact across boundaries, to share competency and to absorb knowledge external to the 
organization. Large companies were challenged by smaller start-ups with external R&D 
facilities and a new imperative emerged: Innovate or die. Innovation was no longer an internal 
phenomenon, and if the successful companies of the 20th century wanted to maintain 
technological superiority and commercial viability, they would have to reorganize, cut costs on 
innovation and absorb knowledge outside the established path of the organization. The 
reorganization involved external collaboration and knowledge flows affecting innovation 
selection directly (Powell et al., 1996). This required a new set of formal rules to deal with 
challenges to innovation selection that the closed model of innovation was unable to handle 
(Chesbrough, 2006)5. The old established technology leaders imposed new initiatives to catch 
up with competitors introducing solutions that made their technology obsolete.  
The classic example of the 20th century was Xerox, a high-tech company focusing on 
high-speed copy machines and printers. At their internal research center, scientists and 
engineers developed several new solutions built on radical technologies. Innovation initiatives 
like the mouse and the user interface for PC were terminated because they were not compatible 
with the business of copy machines and printers (Isaksen and Tidd 2006: 55) . At the time, 
newly established companies like Apple and Microsoft based their own products on the 
                                                 
5 The new methods and rules are introduced in chapter 3.2 
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technology developed at the Xerox research center. Consequently, Apple and Microsoft earned 
tremendous commercial benefits (Chesbrough, 2006: 130). In this case, Xerox had been 
exposed to path dependency.  
3.1.1 Innovation challenges to innovation selection 
In a path dependent company, technology change transpires from a history of technology 
development over a longer period of time (Mokyr, 1990: 163). Path dependency would also 
apply for institutions and policies within the company (North, 1990) (Pierson, 
2000) .Institutions can help companies avoid the challenges arising from path dependency. 
Formal and informal ties can encourage companies to avoid being stuck to a particular 
technology path and remain open to different and competing ideas in the early phases of 
technology development (Fagerberg 2005: 10).  
The old technology leaders of the 20th century, for instance, enjoyed progress from the 
path following the closed model of innovation (Mokyr, 1990: 163). By following a technology 
path, the companies were locked into the same “path” through different reinforcing effects. 
When a company is locked into a technology path, it has suffered from a lock-in effect. When 
alternative and superior technology paths emerged companies could be locked out from these 
when it has become too costly or too late to switch paths (Fagerberg 2005: 10). When companies 
are barred to develop technologies, or their technology is rejected by the market they have they 
sufferied from a lockout effect (Schilling, 1998). Lock-in and lockout are effects from path-
dependency.  
 It has been claimed that the oil and gas industry is a conservative sector where market 
conditions change slowly, and consequently the introduction of radical innovations is difficult 
(Von Tunzelmann and Acha, 2005: 409). Therefore, this is an industry particularly exposed to 
path dependency. Another innovation challenge that appears across the main contributions to 
the innovation literature is inertia, or resistance to change, as Schumpeter (1947) describes it. 
Inertia is a part of every individual, the company and the society, and it makes it very difficult 
to succeed with innovation initiatives. Inertia also applies to the implementation of new ways 
of managing innovation. Fagerberg (2005) emphasizes that inertia can be overcome by 
establishing institutions that secures variety within the system. Variety can be secured through 
rewards and by steps that reduce uncertainty of the future outcome of the innovation (Fagerberg, 
2003: 152). 
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 Another major challenge that may occur is the “not-invented-here syndrome” (NIH-
syndrome). The NIH-syndrome becomes evident when the rejected innovative idea originates 
from an environment external to the organization or the individual. If the rejection happens 
because the idea is seen as too distant from the core knowledge base of the organization, the 
organization risks being locked-out from different technology paths (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990: 137). Therefore NIH-syndrome, and in turn the lockout effect, can be a vast challenge to 
make optimal decisions in the screening of innovation projects.  
 The literature indicates that path dependency, inertia and NIH-syndrome interrelates. 
Furthermore, it can be assumed that a company subject to one of these challenges could easily 
experience the other challenges and risk being locked out from radical ideas that competitors 
may catch up on. The theory points to the relationship between institutions and these challenges 
as intertwined.  
3.2 Management tools for innovation 
Many selection principles are described in the literature to help companies improve their 
selection initiatives. This section aims to explain three of the most popular approaches; Open 
Innovation, the Stage-Gate System and the Innovation Funnel. This is important to understand 
how companies use selection principles to identify viable innovation initiatives with a high 
potential to succeed. 
3.2.1 Open Innovation 
Recently, companies have reorganized their business models to collaborate with stakeholders 
and customers on their innovation projects. Defined by Chesbrough et al. (2006), the “open 
innovation model is the use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge to accelerate 
internal innovation and to expand the markets for external use of innovation respectively”. 
Open innovation assumes that organizations can and should use external ideas as well as 
internal ideas to search, screen and initially select innovative ideas (Chesbrough et al., 2006: 
1). A major difference of open innovation compared to its antecedent, the closed model of 
innovation, lies in how organizations screen their ideas. In any R&D process, researchers and 
their managers must separate poor proposals from the good ones so they can discard the former 
while pursuing commercialization of the latter. Both models are adept at weeding out “false 
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positives” (bad ideas that initially look promising), but open innovation also incorporates the 
ability to rescue “false negatives” (projects that initially seem to lack promise but turn out to be 
seemingly valuable) (Chesbrough et al., 2006: 130). Through exposure to external knowledge, 
companies may counteract path dependency in the selection of innovations and gain innovation 
initiatives with a higher potential to succeed.  
3.2.2 Stage-Gate System  
The Stage-Gate system leaves little room for flexibility and is often used as a roadmap for large 
innovation projects in manufacturing companies. It is similar to the Funnel in the sense that 
projects are filtered according to business opportunities during the development process (Tidd 
and Bessant 2009: 315). The Stage-Gate system works well as a control system with innovation 
occurring through a number of stages where different decision criteria must be passed. The 
overall objective is to ensure a review of technical and marketing data at a number of stages 
throughout the innovation process (Tidd and Bessant 2009: 388). The system is a stringent tool 
leaving little room for flexibility and can be well suited for incremental innovations (Tidd and 
Bessant 2009: 314-315). The Funnel is better suited to manage radical innovations since they 
are difficult to formalize into a strict linear process (Godin 2006). It is more flexible and less 
stringent than the Stage-Gate system. In addition, the Funnel has the ability to reconsider 
innovation commitment throughout the process, emphasizing that some projects may turn out 
to be too risky or too costly to complete (Tidd and Bessant 2009: 315). This is crucial because 
some successful radical innovations appears as a spin-off from the initial innovation project, or 
from an informal setting that is difficult to manage with a Stage-Gate system (Tidd and Bessant 
2009: 314). Consequently, a Stage-Gate system seems to be too simple and stringent for 
organizations aiming to develop successful radical innovations.  
3.2.3 Innovation Funnel 
In each phase of the Funnel presented in Figure 1, the risk related of failing with innovations is 
reduced (Tidd and Bodley, 2002). The idea is to increase the commitment to innovation projects 
over time and to make stepwise decisions on where to allocate scarce resources (Tidd and 
Bessant, 2009: 312 - 313). When conducting commercial analysis considering resource 
constraints, understanding the allocation of scarce resources is essential (Tidd and Bodley 
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2002). Central to this process is knowledge to reduce risk in the early phases where uncertainty 
related to innovation selection is high, and this knowledge is gathered by conducting R&D, 
market research, competitor analysis and trend spotting (Tidd and Bessant 2009: 312). 
The Funnel can be useful as a roadmap providing the decision maker with some 
guidance in a complex environment of decision-making. At the same time, it has the flexibility 
to include diverse knowledge and enable access to unlimited sources of information in the early 
stages of the innovation process. By opening up for a variety of knowledge flows, one can 
reduce many challenges to innovation selection and this is crucial since it opens up for 
allocating resources to viable innovation initiatives later on. Given the high risk associated to 
radical innovation projects, this can be essential to increase the success rate. Finally, there is 
need for some formal features and strategic management of the selection process (Tidd and 
Bessant 2009: 342) and the next section will outline formal and informal rules from the theory 
of neo-institutionalism affecting how companies perform innovation. 
3.3 Neo institutionalism 
Institutionalism can be used to analyse innovation selection because it seeks to address why and 
how organizations behave in a certain manner and describes the relationship between an 
organization and its environment (Greenwood et al., 2008: 28). Institutional factors only exist 
if they affect behavior, and once an institution is established, formal or informal, it takes time 
to change it (Powell and Colyvas, 2008).This thesis will present three levels of institutional 
literature proven to affect organizational behavior. This is essential to redeem answers for the 
proposition that institutional factors affects innovation selection strongly.   
3.3.1 Macro level institutional factors 
Powell and DiMaggio united the different strands of institutionalism within organizational 
analysis into a one theory, neo-institutionalism (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Institutionalism 
opens up for a multidimensional analysis of the organization. Macro level institutionalism 
emphasizes the importance of legal and political conditions supporting technology 
development. Local, national or international governments typically draw legal and political 
conditions, policies or formal laws, which defines the regulatory framework of a geographical 
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area. This legal framework can give benefits to certain companies and turn out to be a 
disadvantage for others (Hwang and Powell, 2005: 182). 
Occasionally macro level institutional factors may change abruptly and have the 
potential of affecting innovation initiatives strongly. This often occurs when groups seize 
unexpected opportunities, for instance after an election, a coup or a civil war (Hwang and 
Powell 2005: 182). Legal or political conditions can change and companies will have to comply 
with a new set of laws and regulations (Hwang and Powell 2005). Institutions on a macro level 
present a higher challenge when companies select innovations for unstable markets with 
unpredictable institutional factors. Suppliers to the oil and gas industry often develop and 
deliver new technology for application in large engineering projects managed by oil and gas 
companies. These innovation projects involve permanent commitments, uneven allocation of 
profits and high probabilities of failure (Miller and Lessard, 2001: 2). Therefore, if political and 
legal conditions change often and are unpredictable, companies run a higher risk of missing 
ROI on innovations. The literature refers to unstable and unpredictable political and legal 
conditions as institutional risks (Lessard and Miller, 2001). To be clear: Institutional risks refer 
to risks that institutional factors have on future ROI for innovation projects.  
 Institutional risks can be reduced through compliance. Compliance programs are the 
internal programs and policy decisions made by a company in order to meet the standards set 
by government laws and regulations (Investopedia, 2014). Managing compliance is important 
for companies operating in the natural resource industry since they have been granted a licence 
to manage the non-renewable commodities of a country. Many companies emphasize that acting 
in accordance with local laws and regulations is important to reduce risk when innovations are 
introduced into a new area (EY, 2012). Secondly, authorities or standardization committees can 
lay down technical standards for a specific industrial sector. Companies may decide to innovate 
or to develop new technology to meet the public requirements laid down by technical standards. 
In many circumstances, standards are voluntary, but they affect how companies behave (Hwang 
and Powell, 2005: 182). Third, informal institutional factors on a macro level usually involve 
activities where companies engage in forums to discuss formal agreements with governments 
or NGO’s6 to build a common practice. Forum and informal discussions may establish norms 
or a practice to how companies should innovate. The latter is an example of a formal 
institutional factor on a macro level (Hwang and Powell, 2005: 191). 
                                                 
6 NGO is an abbreviation for Non Governmental Organization. 
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Lessard and Miller (2001) emphasize that laws governing ROI, property rights or 
intellectual property rights (IPR), and contracts highly influence the success or failure of 
innovation projects. Poorly enforced political and legal conditions can lead to corruption. 
According to (Jain, 2001: 72),corruption seems to affect the willingness companies have to 
invest in a country. Also, Jain suggests that corruption affects the incentives governments 
adopts for innovation. In addition, corruption affects how laws and regulations are 
implemented. Innovations developed at OEM’s may be intended for countries with high levels 
of corruption or unstable local conditions. Both have the potential of affecting the success or a 
failure of an innovation.  
Governments can establish legal or political conditions leading to inequality or poor 
socioeconomic conditions for the local population. Companies who enter such markets with 
innovation projects may encounter resistance from local groups, economic-development 
agencies, and influential pressure groups (Miller and Lessard, 2001).These challenges can be 
countered through communication or by creating local content. Local content can describe the 
range of benefits the oil and gas industry can bring to the areas where it operates (Olsen, 2014).  
3.3.2 Inter-organizational institutional factors 
Nearly all organizations execute innovation through some form of inter-organizational 
collaboration (Powell et al., 1996: 116). Formal institutional factors regulate this type of 
collaboration through contracts. Inter-organizational factors become increasingly evident when 
they are hindering effective innovation collaboration. A lack of trust between the parties, 
difficulties in relinquishing control, the complexity of a joint project, and variance in the ability 
to learn new skills, are all informal factors that are affecting inter-organizational collaboration 
(Powell et al., 1996).  
 Companies are motivated to engage in inter-organizational innovation collaboration 
to acquire resources and skills they cannot produce themselves as long as the hazards of 
cooperation can be held to a tolerable level. Inter-organizational collaboration in the selection 
of innovation initiatives can appear from a motivation to access new knowledge to catch up 
with competitors or gain competitive advantage. Furthermore, companies decide to collaborate 
on innovation projects to reduce the risk of failure. A formal agreement usually leads to a 
number of informal collaboration ties (Powell et al., 1996). Companies may engage in inter-
organizational collaboration to meet requirements laid down by entities of power on a macro 
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level or on an intra-organizational level, for instance requirements to a technical standard. The 
common practice for companies to meet these requirements is to certify the technology by an 
independent body, typically another company. The certificate in itself is a formal institutional 
factor, but the norm to adhere to a voluntary standard is informal (Powell et al., 1996). Finally 
informal institutional factors on an inter-organizational level can involve activities like forums 
to discuss formal agreements where companies can engage in building a common practice, or 
in turn a formal institutional factor. Forums are also common on a macro level where 
governments and NGO’s are attending (Hwang and Powell, 2005: 191). 
3.3.3 Intra-organizational institutional factors 
On an intra-organizational level, institutional factors can be formal rules passed by the 
management or the manager, and implemented into the organization as clear routines, goals or 
rules affecting how employees behave. Institutional factors on this level can be informal, for an 
instance norms or taken-for-granted beliefs within the organization (Powell and DiMaggio, 
1991: 27 - 28). Intra-organizational factors are reproduced and asserted significance when 
employees engage in their practical everyday work, solve problems and derive answers to these 
problems based on routines or guidelines. From these actions, employees develop a working 
logic, and they make deliberate choices to comply with one logic and resist another. 
Consequently, institutional factors on this level can be the principles companies use to select 
innovation initiatives. In addition, it can be a contributing factor to why the individuals choose 
to select one innovation initiative and resist the other. Also, social interaction between members 
of an organization, or how members of an organization communicate, is a type of informal 
factor tying members together (Powell and Colyvas, 2008: 279).  
Intra-organizational institutional factors are directly linked to performance because 
norms and formal rules within the organization directly affect how employees behave. How 
employees behave is emphasized as a vital factor to innovation, since intra organizational 
collaboration is an integral part of succeeding with innovations. Superior performance, 
however, can be achieved if these institutional factors can adapt to changes in environmental 
conditions (Rose, Naresh et al. 2008: 47). Different environmental conditions may include 
demands from customers and stakeholders or different political or local conditions in a market. 
Intra-organizational factors can be influenced by changing external environmental conditions 
(Acemoglu et al., 2012: 63). Therefore, companies should develop institutional factors that can 
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adapt to external changes or different external market conditions but at the same time provide 
efficient internal integration of these changes (Chatman et al., 2013: 16).   
For an institutional factor to be influential, members of the company must share a 
common set of expectations about appropriate or inappropriate attitudes and behaviors. These 
attitudes and behaviors must, in turn, be consistently aligned and reinforced across divisions 
and management levels (Chatman et al., 2013: 12). Organizational norms that facilitate 
flexibility and experimentation within the company can enhance organizational innovation and 
adaptation (Kotter and Heskett: 1992). Another intra-organizational institutional factor 
emphasized in the literature is educated employees trained with professional knowledge, who 
also possess knowledge of organizational jurisdiction. These individuals are often found in 
positions with the ability to change intra-organizational institutional factors. They have the 
authority to reshape the informal or formal ties, particularly with respect to definitions of the 
law. Similarly, occupational groups and technical professionals engage in the creation of 
standards. When these technical procedures are widely diffused, the existing set of 
organizational practices regarding innovation selection can be altered in subtle or profound 
ways (Hwang and Powell 2005).   
This section has introduced institutional factors on all three levels, formal and informal, 
that affects how companies manage the selection of innovation initiatives. Knowledge of 
institutional factors can facilitate the selection of radical innovation initatives, and the 
remaining part of this chapter will introduce how a company should select radial innovations.  
3.4 Managing the innovation portfolio 
The thesis argues that the oil and gas industry can use radical innovations based on technology 
from a competing path to cut costs and reduce greenhouse gas emissions, these being major 
challenges facing the industry. In this respect, this section will argue why a company should 
use selection principles to facilitate radical innovations. According to Nagji and Tuff (2012), 
companies should allocate their resources with 70% to incremental innovations, 20% to radical 
innovations within the current technology path and 10% to radical innovations from a 
competing technology path. This resource allocation has to be adjusted to how companies 
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performs commercially. For high performing companies7, the distribution of return is 70 % on 
radical innovations based on radical technology from a competing path, 20% on radical 
innovations within the same technology path and 10 % on incremental innovations (Nagji and 
Tuff 2012: 70). Targeting a balanced innovation portfolio is difficult and only a few companies 
have the competency to develop such a broad range of innovations. A poorly managed portfolio 
means wasted time and a waste of resources leading the company into commercial decline 
(Ibid). Obtaining a balanced portfolio entails the allocation of resources in a sound manner 
ensuring good ROI, and this is essential if the organization wants to expand, increase revenue 
and prolong commercial viability (Cooper et al., 2001: a: 74).  
 In a mature industry like the natural resource industry where change happens slowly, 
Project Portfolio Management (PPM) can counter innovation selection challenges by enhancing 
variety over uniformity. PPM manages risk by diversifying resources and ensuring a balance in 
innovations entering formal development. In this respect, PPM can be a selection principle to 
evaluate new projects, select and prioritize projects, in addition to allocate and reallocate 
resources between the selected projects (Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 2007: 4). PPM use several 
factors besides the traditional economic variables to estimate the success of innovation projects 
(Tidd and Bessant 2009: 341). The most common indicators used to manage innovation 
portfolios have traditionally been financial criteria. These methods rate the projects according 
to a financial estimate. The problem with these methods, however, is that before a project is 
established, projections of ROI are speculative due to high risk.  They are more appropriate for 
evaluating a single project and is therefore not described further on as a measurement technique 
for innovation portfolio management (Tidd and Bodley 2002: 130-131). 
 PPM can be utilized efficiently if the company is able to select innovations that 
constitute a balanced portfolio with a mix of projects that are incremental and radical. 
Furthermore, PPM decreases the potential of selecting low value projects since the selection 
decision follows a number of effective selection principles on how to allocate resources subject 
to proper consideration beforehand. In addition, risk of missing ROI is reduced since portfolio 
management ensures that resources are allocated according to long term and short term goals. 
Recently, pressure has increased for companies to select or terminate innovation initiatives 
faster, thus having a tool in the early phases (Cooper et al., 2000: 5 - 10) can turn out to be an 
advantage. Companies can choose to build a to business case to provide a pathway for radical 
                                                 
7 Nagji and Tuff describes high performing company as a company with a leadership position in its industry. These 
companies may want to diversify their investments between type of innovation to reduce risk (Nagji and Tuff 2012: 
70). 
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ideas in the early phases of innovation. This can essentially be a “parallel” funnel to regular 
innovation development allowing a portfolio with higher risk ideas and options (Tidd and 
Bessant 2009: 332). Rapid prototyping and fast-works are tools to help the decision maker to 
make the right decisions based on physical representations and data simulations of form and 
substance (Tidd and Bessant 2009: 317) (Ries, 2011). 
 After the selection, a number of difficulties may occur in the implementation of 
the project itself. At the same time, the selected innovation projects should be in line with 
corporate strategy (Cooper et al., 2001: 8). Another challenge pointed out by Cooper (2001), 
appears through the selection of too many innovations, resulting in the organization being 
unable to develop ideas properly. Furthermore, a portfolio with a broad strategic scope can give 
organizations multiple opportunities to pull their resources and technologies across various 
markets (Grewal et al., 2008: 263). Portfolio methods try to deal with the issue of reviewing 
across a set of projects and work out a balance of economic and non-financial risk or reward 
factors (Tidd and Bessant 319).  The goal is to enable predictions if an innovation initiative will 
lead to success or failure. It is crucial to evaluate across the entire portfolio of projects, even 
when decisions are being made for a single project only (McNally et al., 2013: 247). In fierce 
competition with competing companies in globalized markets and increasing demands from 
customers, the knowledge of gaining an in-depth understanding on how to allocate the resources 
of the company is essential (Cooper 2007: 3). The main benefit of portfolio management is how 
it considers several innovations in the attempt to maximize return.  
On the one hand, a challenge with portfolio management is how it reinforces conflicting 
interests within a company and this can enhance difficulties to find a consistent and unified 
selection strategy. However, this flexibility is why it can be applied to a selection model which 
utilizes institutional variables since it can be adjusted to represent multiple disciplines (Cooper 
et al., 2001: a: 2- 4). On the other hand, the purpose of portfolio management is to provide a 
coherent basis to evaluate or to decide on which projects to be undertaken, and to ensure a good 
balance across the portfolio of risk and potential reward (Tidd and Bessant 2009: 216). In 
practice, this can work by regular scheduled reviews of all projects to ensure alignment with 
the company strategy.  
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3.5 How to facilitate radical innovations 
An organization who has introduced a number of these innovations is Pentagon’s Defence 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), a tiny organization with a relatively modest 
budget developing a number of innovations upsetting the current technological trajectory, for 
instance the internet. They attract talented employees who are very skilled in collaboration. The 
project managers who initiate the selection decision usually have a master’s degree and ten 
years of working experience. They have the personal attributes of successful CEO’s in the 
industry. Their selection procedure consists of individual projects with fast iterations 
subsequently terminated or selected of the project leader. In spite of high uncertainty, DARPA 
has managed to create internal routines and an organization with an intense culture of 
adaptability. They have managed this by hiring temporary teams of personnel with diverse 
backgrounds working well together on each separate innovation project (Dugan and Gabriel, 
2013). DARPA has introduced several revolutionizing solutions like the ethernet 
3.6 Summary  
The chapter has provided a theoretical framework to increase knowledge on the challenges 
companies may encounter in the selection of innovations. Early phase innovation has changed 
from a strict internal process into open innovation with external partners where external 
knowledgeflows and collaboration efforts have become increasingly important. Increasing 
knowledge on how institutional factors, formal and informal, affect the selection of innovations 
can provide more insights reducing the risk of failure. Radical innovations can be a solution to 
solve some of the major challenges facing the oil and gas industry and this chapter has 
introduced a theoretical framework encompassing knowledge and routines to facilitate radical 
innovation initiatives.  
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4 Methodology Chapter 
 
This chapter will justify the choice of case as research design, choice of research object and the 
chosen research techniques. The researcher will clarify methods to maintain well-documented 
and well-founded procedures for data collection and data analysis. The chapter concludes with 
reflections regarding limitations of research strategy, validity, reliability and ethical concerns. 
4.1 Justification of choice of case as methodical approach 
This case study examines selection principles GE Oil and Gas use to select innovation 
initiatives. The thesis is based on the assumption that innovation selection in a large commercial 
company is affected by institutional factors and that the selection of radical innovations is very 
challenging. I chose to limit the scope to the facilitation of radical innovation projects because 
the vast majority of all new product introductions at GE Oil and Gas are incremental according 
to several informants. Therefore, this case study can be defined as a critical study, aiming to 
critically test theoretical components on an area with little previous social science research. 
Consequently, the researcher has been given access to the unusual case (Yin, 2014: 52). In 
addition, because none of the three case studies have been subject for social science research 
before, the researcher has been given access to the revelatory case study. The results can 
contribute to an increased understanding that may confirm, challenge or extend the theory 
related to innovation management (Yin, 2014: 50 - 52). The three embedded case studies have 
been chosen to show the variance of innovation initiatives this company (George and Bennett, 
2005: 85).  
Following the definition from Punch (2005: 12),qualitative research is defined as 
collecting written data of empirical information about social behavior not presented 
numerically. The general objective of a case study is to study one single case in detail and to 
develop a thorough understanding of that case using any appropriate research methods (Punch 
2005: 144). The research questions have required a thorough and diverse in-depth investigation 
of social behavior at GE. Consequently, it has been chosen to conduct a qualitative case study. 
Qualitative research is usually performed through interviews, observations or document 
analysis (Winchester and Rofe, 2010: 8). All three techniques have been used to collect data in 
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this thesis, in addition to a qualitative internet survey. Furthermore, the semi-structured 
interview has been the primary source of retrieving data on how informants, employees at GE 
or their stakeholders, perceive technology development in the oil and gas industry (Punch, 
2005).  
 
 
Figure 2: Visualization of innovation collaboration across three institutional levels. 
Figure 2 presents how the thesis analyses the selection principles for reviewing 
innovation initiatives in GE Oil and Gas. The three blue arrows represent how GE Oil and Gas 
collaborates on three levels when they select innovation projects. The large grey arrow pointing 
in two directions implies that the innovation factors listed underneath comes into existence 
when GE Oil and Gas collaborates with partners on three institutional levels. In addition, Figure 
2 proposes that institutional factors on all three levels affect innovation selection at GE Oil and 
Gas, and that each level of collaboration intertwines with innovation factors. 
4.2 Qualitative research as a methodology 
The case study on GE Oil and Gas has been an intensive single case study of individuals, groups 
of individuals and an entire organization from October 2013 until May 2014 (Hay, 2010: 370). 
The flexibility of case-study as a methodology and the tools8 from qualitative data collection 
                                                 
8Methodology is referring to the case study as a strategy to understand data, as opposed to a method that is a tool 
to gather data (Punch 2005: 144). 
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provides the opportunity to utilize any appropriate method for conducting research (Punch 
2005: 144). This has been crucial to enable a three level analysis of decision-making at GE 
visualized in Figure 2.  
According to Yin, the case study is appropriate as a methodical approach when the form 
of the research question is explanatory asking a “how” or “why” question (Yin 2014: 10). All 
three research questions in this particular thesis are explanatory by posing “how” questions 
requiring in-depth research to raise sufficient answers. In addition, this case study has been 
performed from an institutional perspective across three levels. Only a case study with a 
qualitative design can handle the complexity of studying a decision in-depth on an individual 
level and at the same time place this decision in a global energy context (Punch, 2005). Also, 
the three case studies looks at decision making in three very different contexts, aiming to 
highlight the variation of how innovation initiatives are screened and at the same time illuminate 
similarities and differences across three cases. Where a quantitative study would exclude many 
contextual factors and derive answers to statements or a clear hypothesis, a qualitative study 
allow for contextual comparison (George and Bennett, 2005: 22). For these reasons, the 
qualitative design is seen as beneficial in order to gather all threads and to answer the research 
questions raised in this thesis. 
 I use a single case design placing GE Oil and Gas in an international oil and energy 
context. At the same time, three embedded case studies have been performed revealing contexts 
of their own and exploring the same theoretical concepts through different lenses. The case 
study allows for contextual comparison (George and Bennett, 2005: 19), this is necessary to 
operationalize institutional factors, to analyse how they deal with the challenges to innovation 
selection and how they affect the screening of innovation projects. The methodical framework 
operationalizes theoretical concepts into variables that according to theory have an effect on the 
future success or failure of innovation projects. The methodical design looks at three 
dimensions where GE operates (See Figure 2), and therefore it is vital to enable the investigation 
of complex causal relationships (George and Bennett, 2005: 22). Furthermore, linking the 
variables from each case to the overall context has been crucial to address the challenges to 
innovation selection (George and Bennett, 2005:22). For this reason, the researcher has chosen 
to conduct a qualitative case study. 
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4.3 Access to case 
In the early stages of my research, I was determined to look at decision-making in the screening 
of innovation projects at a commercial company. I had trouble to find a company who 
conducted innovation in the close-proximity of Oslo and it was challenging to be confident on 
the topic itself. Recognizing the limitations of my own empirical and theoretical knowledge, I 
decided to perform a survey where on 17 organizations from September to October 2013. I used 
criterion sampling by ensuring that all of them performed innovation (Bradshae and Stratford, 
2010). 
The first objective with this survey was to see if institutional factors were considered 
when commercial companies screened innovation projects and examine why a project would 
be terminated or selected. My second objective was to establish a connection to potential case 
studies acknowledging how this could be appropriate as a methodology (Yin. 2014: 10-11) 
since decision-making was at the very heart of the approach (Yin, 2014). The third objective 
and the main goal of the survey, was to gain insight to how empirical innovation selection 
actually occurred at commercial organizations. In an informal meeting with an experienced 
survey respondent from the Oil and Gas industry, I received the contact information to a senior 
employee at GE Oil and Gas. Referred to as snowball sampling in the current literature, 
receiving information from people who know other people in the industry proved to be how I 
gained access to this case study (Bradshaw and Stratford, 2010: 75). 
GE was rated as one of Norway’s most innovative organizations in 2008 (Gram, 2008). 
With this mind, I got in touch with a senior employee with the senior employee at GE Oil and 
Gas. After two introduction meetings, the scope of the thesis had been narrowed down into 
manageable research questions (George and Bennett 2005, 84). I signed an engagement until 
June 2014 giving me access to three case studies where GE Oil and Gas collaborated with 
customers or stakeholders on the screening, selection and termination of innovation initiatives. 
The engagement would simplify and guarantee access to data and potential informants if I 
performed an embedded single-case study on GE Oil and Gas (Yin 2014). For these two 
reasons, I decided to go for an embedded single-case design.  
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4.4 Data Collection 
In this thesis, data have been collected from an internet survey of 17 Norwegian innovative 
commercial organizations, through document analysis from public and confidential records, 42 
interviews with 38 informants and 4 official observations. In addition, data was gathered from 
my desk at GE Oil and Gas where informants were observed in their natural setting. In order to 
perform data collection in a responsible manner, it is critical to establish methods that ensure 
trustworthiness to the way qualitative research is conducted (Bradshaw and Stratford, 2010: 
77). By applying the principle of triangulation9, meaning multiple sources, methods, 
investigators and theories to data collection, trustworthiness enhances the credibility of the 
results (Bradshaw and Stratford, 2010: 77). Through surveys, interviews, document analysis 
and observations, data could be collected and interpreted from multiple sources. From 
collaborating with GE Oil and Gas and by checking with my two supervisors at the University 
of Oslo, the theoretical framework and the methodological framework was challenged and 
developed throughout the process and has always been a subject to modification and 
improvement. The collaboration with GE Oil and Gas gave me access to documents used for 
contextual purposes before interviewing informants. The documents were also important to 
retrieve more data from the observations.  
4.5 Interviews 
Interviews have been the primary source to investigate how collaboration activities influence 
decision-making, and how the screening of innovation projects were affected by institutional 
factors on three levels. The strength of the interview to examine complex behavior in-depth, 
and to highlight the individual perception of each informants has been critical in order to 
measure the theoretical concepts on the case studies (Dunn, 2010). In addition, by identifying 
the scope of my thesis into four themes and accordingly four interview guides, all interviews 
were aimed at retrieving data from informants with relevant knowledge tied to one of the three 
levels of analysis. 
 The interview technique has been essential to complete research for this thesis i.e.: From 
the beginning through informal talks with informants to reach an understanding of the empirical 
                                                 
9 Triangulation is described further in the section on reliability and validity.  
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commercialized innovation, and later on as a strategic tool to retrieve data on different topics 
related to each research question. I decided to perform semi-structured interviews, where I 
adjusted the interview guide before each interview. A semi structured design set no restrictions 
for raising new questions or prompts during the interviews (Dunn, 2010: 102). This was seen 
as highly beneficial since all informants had a lot of experience on the topic in question, 
accordingly it was not impossible to anticipate the responses I would receive. Also, due to their 
experience from the industry I had some open-ended questions anticipating that I could also 
receive information on one of the other topics of interest. This flexibility was necessary with 
informants from several organizations leading to small question adjustments of the interview 
guide. 
The guide was sent to the informant together with an information letter beforehand to 
build rapport. Rapport has been defined as establishing a relationship with the informant based 
on confidence and mutual understanding (Cooper and Schindler, 2003: 329). This provided the 
interviewer and the informant with a setting where both could feel at ease aiming to generate 
more insightful and valid data (Dunn, 2010). The information letter described the background 
for chosen topic, why I wanted to include the informant as a participant and the time and the 
scope for the interview; All of which were seen as important in order to gain rapport (Dunn 
2010: 113). 
4.5.1 Conducting interviews 
I selected interview participants using two techniques: Criterion sampling and snowballing. All 
informants were selected on the basis of having met the criteria of having vast experience, 
competency and knowledge on the topic in question (Bradshaw and Stratford 2010: 75). 
Criterion sampling was applied to retrieve as much in-depth information on the actual topic as 
possible (Punch 2005: 187). However, identifying informants with this type of in-depth 
knowledge on each topic proved to be difficult in some cases. The process of getting in touch 
with potential informants occurred by email, telephone or even a contact visit. This was time 
consuming, but seen as important in order to achieve informed consent and to establish a good 
relationship before conducting the interview (Seidman, 1991: 46 - 47). As a result, even if the 
potential informant did not want to participate due to lack of experience, I often received advice 
of potential informants with a lot of knowledge on the matter. 
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I received contact information to informants from sponsors at GE Oil and Gas. Other 
interviews came as a result from a snow-ball effect after initial interviews with informants. The 
interviews were performed at the work location of the informant as long as their offices were 
in the close proximity of Oslo and accessible by public transportation. If the informant was 
located elsewhere, the interview was conducted on the phone due to travel expenses and time 
or at a time when the informant was in Oslo through work.  
 First of all, it would be difficult to arrange for longer interviews due to busy work 
schedules of the informants. I planned for each interview to last about one hour for two reasons.. 
The informants were extremely busy and this was the only opportunity to interview them. In 
addition, it could be difficult to retrieve desired information if the interview was shorter. On the 
third case study, I performed interviews in the field and these were a lot shorter due to practical 
reasons Al together, the informants came from a number of organizations aiming to illuminate 
different individual understandings to each topic. This was important since the overall theme 
of developing radical innovations was seen as controversial in itself, but also it was beneficial 
to collect data from informants with various backgrounds (ibid)  
Preparations for conducting a successful interview required hours of work. The 
interview guide was made up of between 5-9 primary questions with secondary prompts on 
areas to encourage the informant to elaborate on the chosen topic (Dunn 2010: 107). Each 
interview guide was tested through a pilot interview with an experienced senior employee on 
innovation at GE Oil and Gas to ensure feasibility (Monk and Bedford, 2010: 325). In addition, 
my supervisor at the University of Oslo commented on the guide before a conclusion was made 
regarding the final interview design. The aim was to avoid interview bias from poorly 
articulated questions in order to ensure trustworthiness and reliability through triangulation of 
multiple sources on how to interpret the collected data.  (Yin 2014: 106).  
I applied a procedure where I interacted verbally with all informants beforehand and 
then sent information about my thesis on e-mail. The informant was also informed that the 
interview would be recorded and that he or she had to sign a letter of consent (Cooper and 
Schindler 2003: 326). In addition, the informant could decide where the interview would take 
place. This routine was not always possible to follow due to lack of time and difficulties in 
getting hold of some informants. In the first two interviews, I experienced that it was more 
difficult to establish rapport with my informants and to gain their personal opinion. Before one 
of these interviews, I did not interact verbally with the informant beforehand. In addition, the 
interview was conducted in English and on the phone. One reason could be that it was 
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challenging to establish rapport with the informant and to gain access to his personal thoughts 
and perceptions. Also, I had trouble handling the flexibility which the semi-structured interview 
provided by giving the informant insufficient explanations to some of the questions along the 
way. In addition, it was challenging to remain confident, especially when the informant was 
critical to some of the questions. This lead to some difficulties in knowing when to initiate 
prompts and to counter the challenges of my personal characteristic as a young female student 
and social position as a researcher (Dowling 2010: 35).  
All informants I interviewed were employees in large corporations or government 
organizations. I encountered the asymmetrical relationship (Dowling, 2010: 32) between me, 
the researcher, and the informants who all had powerful positions and dealt with this by 
involving the perceptions of people of similar power into the methodology work to learn from 
their experience (Dowling 2010: 33). I received help from senior employees on management 
level at GE Oil and Gas in reviewing interview guides, introducing me to informants and 
offering help and support.  
To solve some challenges I encountered in the interview context, I decided to transcribe 
the interviews straight away meaning that I started to analyze the data in January (Punch 2005). 
This was highly beneficial to reflect on why I was unable to establish rapport10 and how I could 
improve my own interview technique before the next interview. By listening to how the 
informant responded to my questions, I learned quickly how to position myself and to phrase 
the questions objectively. Several of the informants were highly experienced and it was 
important to value their opinions. At the same time, the informants could have difficulties to 
express their personal opinion on some of the questions. I solved this challenge by expressing 
knowledge on the topic and implemented some of my own subjective opinions. This was highly 
beneficial because it resulted in an informal discussion where valuable qualitative data was 
gathered, and at the same time removing barriers the informant previously had felt to 
communicate his own personal view. Simultaneously, I was careful since this could also affect 
my objectivity as a researcher, and I found that my subjective opinion on the topic was 
influenced by the data I gathered. Consequently, I focused on the need to handle the data 
analysis through critical reflexivity, which was regarded the best strategy to deal with the issues 
of subjectivity and inter-subjectivity (Dowling 2010: 35). This technique was applied to ensure 
validity, and to increase reliability by conducting data analysis in the same procedure. 
                                                 
10 Rapport is…… A more thorough explanation is given in section…. 
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4.6 Observation 
Observation could be defined as “taking part in the world and not just representing it” 
emphasizing various ways observational research may be conducted (Kearns, 2010: 242). 
Punch (2005: 181) emphasizes that observational research must define what will be observed 
and why this is of relevance to answer the research questions. I performed four official 
observations on the 13th of February, 27th of February, 12th of March and 8-10th of April. This 
thesis uses the techniques  by Gold (1958) to describe how observations were performed. I have 
applied three out of four observation techniques to collect data. I will now describe how 
observational research was conducted during my thesis. 
4.6.1 Conducting research as participant-observer 
Observation was particularly important to gather data during the case study in Florence where 
I conducted research as a participant-observer. When undertaking participant-observation, the 
informant is aware of the true identity of the researcher (Gold, 1958: 221). I participated in the 
workshops and the plenary sessions because I wanted to observe the informants in a natural 
setting as a pure direct observant (Punch 2005: 179). This was necessary to collect sufficient 
data to answer the research questions, especially the question on how to facilitate radical 
innovations. I participated directly in how informants screened innovation initiatives and I 
gained first hand data that would be extremely difficult to retrieve from other sources.  
During the case study in Florence, I introduced myself as an intern at GE Oil and Gas 
conducting a master thesis on innovation management. The workshop gave me a contextual and 
holistic understanding of how GE collaborated with external stakeholders to develop 
technology in areas with high institutional risk. I collected data by writing a field diary that was 
updated every day with important reflections and notes. In addition I took many pictures, had a 
number of informal talks and 13 short interviews. During the case study, I encountered some 
situations where I had to deal with the asymmetrical power relationship between the informants 
and me. Through critical reflexivity, I dealt with these situations by reasoning why I was there, 
how this was relevant for the topic of my thesis and emphasizing that I valued their perceptions 
and experience on the case study (Dowling 2010: 33). 
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4.6.2 Conducting research as complete observer 
I conducted observation as a complete observer in two telephone conferences where innovation 
initiatives were discussed between GE and Statoil. The informants were working on an 
innovation projects close to deadline and soon awaiting the selection or termination decision. 
By performing data collection as a complete observer, I was removed from any social 
interaction with the informants (Gold 1958: 221-222). This method was extremely useful to 
collect data for contextual purposed regarding how innovation challenges and institutional 
factors affected innovation selection at GE Oil and Gas. In addition, it gave me insights to how 
GE performed cross-sectional collaboration internally and how they cooperated with Statoil. 
Only the informant who provided access to the observation was aware of my participation. The 
other informants were unaware of my participation (Gold 1958: 219) enabling natural 
observations (Punch 2005: 179). These meetings gave me a possibility to interpret in-depth 
through direct exposure how innovation selection was conducted at GE. In addition, this was 
highly beneficial since the project itself was a project considered on the TCA (Kearns 2010: 
242). Afterwards, I transcribed this data like interview transcriptions. Due to ethical concerns, 
however, it was decided to use the direct observations only to a limited extent in the case study 
analysis. Overall perceptions of internal collaboration on innovation projects have been used to 
analyse case study one11.  
4.6.3 Observer as participant 
This type of observation is performed participant data collection is performed on a short time-
scope and in a formal setting where the data collected is often targeted towards a specific aim 
or to gain an overall understanding of a phenomenon without going in-depth (Gold 1958: 221). 
Kearns (2010) describes this technique as being a newcomer in the crowd watching a new sport. 
I undertook this role from my desk as an intern at GE Oil and Gas, where I gradually gained 
knowledge to how they worked on innovation projects through informal observations.  
 
                                                 
11 Discussed in chapter 4.10. 
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4.7 Documentation 
Document analysis can be defined as the evaluation of historical or contemporary confidential 
or public records, reports, government documents and opinions (Cooper and Schindler 2003: 
152). Documentation has been important to enhance my own knowledge on the contextual 
surroundings of each case, in addition to explaining and operationalizing theoretical concepts 
to informants and respondents. This was possible because documentary data can be specific 
even if it covers a broad topic, in addition of being perceived as unobtrusive for outsiders 
(Yin 2014: 106). I was careful to gather information from several documentation sources 
when creating the table profiles trying to prevent biased selectivity and reporting bias. Bias 
selectivity refers to incomplete data collection, for instance data based on one reference alone. 
Reporting bias on the other hand points to the fact that a document is influenced of the author 
in some way or another (Yin 2014: 106).  
This method has weaknesses as well and can cause many challenges for collecting data. 
As a researcher, I experienced that documentation often was time consuming because I was 
unsure of where to look for information. In addition, it could be difficult to gain access to the 
desired information (Yin 2014: 106) since I used non-public documents to describe the case 
studies was. On the one hand, this information was important to reduce bias and to increase 
validity. On the other hand, I was careful to use documentation primarily for contextual 
purposes and not as a main source of data. Therefore, these weaknesses could be reduced to a 
minimum.  
4.8 Reliability 
Reliability refers to how the case study is conducted.  The goal is to reduce errors and bias in 
the data collection and to ensure that a later researcher can follow the same procedures and 
retrieve the same results from the case study performed for this thesis (Yin 2014: 49). 
Qualitative research demands consistency to how the researcher collects, analyses and presents 
data.  By ensuring high levels of reliability and consistency to how qualitative research is 
performed, the aim is to ensure trustworthiness upon the reader to evaluate how the research 
has been conducted (Bradshaw and Stratford 2010: 77).  
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The researcher performed the same procedures in approaching and interviewing (or 
observing) the informants. In the interview chapter, the reader can find a detailed explanation 
of this procedure to ensure transparency. Transparency means that enough details are provided 
so the reader can gain a complete understanding on how the data was collected and analysed 
(George and Bennett 2005: 106). An overview of major decisions that were undertaken while 
working with the master thesis is presented in the appendix and the table shows that a lot of 
time and effort were used to collect and transcribe data.  
On the last case study I encountered a challenge to keep the quality of reliable methods 
to collect data. The informants were on a tight time schedule and therefore it was not possible 
to use the same procedures on these interviews as the others. Furthermore, I was not given 
access to the participant list until the day before we left for Florence. Exact research questions 
and preparations meant that a tolerable level of reliability still could be maintained when data 
was collected. In addition, transparency have been a focus since the interview guides are 
attached in the appendix, interviews are recorded and data have been analysed in the same 
procedure and visualized in chapter 5-8 (Bradshaw and Stratford 2010). 
4.9 Validity 
Validity is defined as the truthfulness or accuracy of data compared to acceptable criteria (Hay 
2010: 391). In other words, validity questions the findings of a study. Validity is extremely 
important when conducting qualitative research, and therefore I have decided to discuss the 
term in from three perspectives: construct validity, internal validity and external validity. 
It can be challenging to achieve construct validity in case study research. For instance, 
the methods used to measure an institutional factor. The argument implies that a researchers 
subjective judgments would lead to a result confirming the researchers preconceived notions 
(Yin 2014: 46). From the beginning, I dealt with this using by the theoretical framework as a 
starting point for designing interview guides. In addition, key informants and my supervisors 
came with comments along the way. Furthermore, I sought to uphold construct validity by 
interviewing 38 informants from 16 organizations enhancing diversity of data and to counter 
my own preconceived notions leading to subjective judgments of the data analysis. In addition, 
informants were given the opportunity to correct all direct citations. Finally, every step of the 
research has been a subject to revisions and comments from external sources in order to 
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establish an analytical chapter that can present findings with high construct validity (Yin 2014: 
46). 
In order to perform responsible data collection it is critical to establish methods that 
ensure trustworthiness to the way qualitative research is conducted (Bradshaw and Stratford 
2010: 77). The principle of triangulation eas applied to every step fo the process, maintaining 
trustworthiness and increased credibility of the implications presented in chapters 5-9. Through 
surveys, interviews, document analysis and observations, data could be collected and 
interpreted from multiple sources. Internal validity asserts that rival explanations needs to be 
considered to the finding of a case study. The researcher chose to conduct qualitative research 
with interviews as the main source. A challenge to achieve internal validity occurs when 
informants have to recount for events occurring another point in time. Therefore, 
documentation and observations became increasingly important in order to achieve internal 
validity and to clarify rival explanations throughout working with the master thesis (Yin 2014: 
47). Through observation, the researcher could perform direct data collection of informants in 
their natural setting. At times, triangulation was not sufficient to recount for competing 
explanations. Consequently, the researcher chose to reflect critically when internal validity was 
threatened.  
External validity refers to generalizing results can be generalized beyond the immediate 
study. Because the researcher chose to conduct a qualitative case study the results of this study 
cannot be generalized to other case studies. The insights and implications this study comes up 
with, however, can still be useful for other OEM’s conducting innovation. 
4.10 Ethical concerns 
It was important for the researcher to consider ethical concerns to justify direct quotations and 
observations used in the analysis. Detailed information on how the researcher performed ethical 
considerations towards informants is accounted for in the paragraph “conducting interviews”. 
Furthermore, the researcher has named all informants with a masculine term to ensure 
anonymity of the level that was signed and agreed upon by the informants. In addition, the 
researcher allowed ensures written confirmation of direct quotes used in the thesis to ensure 
that the informants were comfortable to me mentioned directly in the thesis (De nasjonale 
forskningsetiske komiteene, 2013).These procedures were also a priority to enable other 
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researchers to conduct a case study on the same object, or collect data from the same participants 
at another point in time.  
4.11 Coding of data 
Punch (2005) describes coding as the specific and concrete act where the researcher begins to 
analyse the collected data with tags and labels (Punch 2005).  
I transcribed data from 42 interviews with 38 informants and began the analysis by 
reading all the documents and pulling out relevant data by sorting it into four categories. The 
four categories were innovation factors and institutional factors on the three levels described in 
chapter three. I used theoretical propositions to shape my strategy of collecting and coding data. 
The interview guides were designed to access information related to these theoretical 
propositions (Yin 2014: 136). The data material was colored after in relation to four topics and 
giving value scores accordingly. This enabled reduction of the data material and classification 
into seven categories. I chose to visualize these factors in 10 Figures to discuss and analyse 
them in chapter 5-9 because visualization was important to compress the data material into 
easily understandable graphs (Punch 2005: 198-199). 
 The institutional factors were divided into six categories on three levels. How this has 
been done is also recounted for elsewhere in the thesis as well. Information was grouped into 
patterns that emerging after each interview. Every time a factor appeared, it was given a point 
from 0-3 regarding how heavily it was emphasized. Afterwards average values and percentage 
values could be produced and presented in graphs placed in chapters 5 - 9. 
I had to address the coding of innovation factors differently because these concepts 
required a more analytical approach reading more of the text and then grasping the underlying 
meaning. Figure 4 displays the answers from all informants on innovation factors regarding 
innovation selection. Each informant were scored on 0, 0,5 or 1 on innovation factors where 0 
indicated that the informant did not mention the factor at all, 0,5 indicated that the informant 
perceived the challenge to some degree, and 1 meant that the informant showed significant 
marks of this challenge. I entered all the values into an excel document where I looked for 
similarities or differences that would make up a pattern to confirm, extend or disprove the 
research questions (Yin 2014: 143). 
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Code Position Organization Length Date 
GE1 Mid-level Manager GE Oil and Gas 90 minutes 18.02, 06.03.2014 
C3A Top Manager Houston Advanced Research Center 5 minutes 08.04.2014 
C3B Top Manager Texas Institute of Science 5 minutes 08.04.2014 
C3D Senior Associate Repsol 5 minutes 08.04.2014 
C3E Top Manager Petoro 5 minutes 08.04.2014 
C3G Top Manager The Norwegian Ministry of Oil and Energy 5 minutes 08.04.2014 
C3H Top Manager The Swiss Federal Office of Energy 5 minutes 09.04.2014 
C3I Top Manager American Petroleum Institute Washington 5 minutes 09.04.2014 
C3J Top Manager Interstate Compact organization 5 minutes 09.04.2014 
C3K Top Manager DNV GL 5 minutes 09.04.2014 
C3L Top Manager EDF 5 minutes 09.04.2014 
C3M Top Manager DNV GL 5 minutes 09.04.2014 
GE10 Manager GE Oil and Gas 45 minutter 06.03.2014 
GE11 Associate GE Oil and Gas 60 minutes 10.03.2014 
GE12 Associate GE Oil and Gas 30 minutes 10.04.2014 
GE13 Associate GE Oil and Gas 60 minutes 27.03.2014 
GE14 Mid-level Manager GE Oil and Gas 90 minutes 28.03.2014 
GE15 Mid-level Manager GE Oil and Gas 30 minutes 10.04.2014 
GE16 Mid-level Manager GE Corporate 5 minutes 08.04.2014 
GE 17 Top Manager GE Corporate 30 minutes 11.03.2014 
GE2 Senior Associate GE Oil and Gas 90 minutter 10.03.2014 
GE3 Senior Associate GE Oil and Gas 60 minutes 27.02.2014 
GE4 Senior Associate GE Oil and Gas 40 minutes 07.02.2014 
GE5 Senior Associate GE Oil and Gas 40 minutes 06.03.2014 
GE6 Senior Associate GE Oil and Gas 45 minutes 06.03.2014 
GE7 Senior Associate GE Oil and Gas 140 minutes 11.02, 28.02.2014 
GE9 Top Manager GE Oil and Gas 70 minutes 
22.01, 28.02, 
10.03.2014 
Grc8 Top Manager GE Global Research 120 minutes 18.02.2014 
IN1 Senior Associate INTSOK 90 minutes 07.02.2014 
OD1 Senior Associate Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 75 minutes 19.02.2014 
SI1 Top Manager Anonymous 45 minutes 03.03.2014 
ST1 Mid-level Manager Statoil 60 minutes 17.02.2014 
ST2 Senior Associate Statoil 45 minutes 10.02.2014 
ST3 Top Manager Statoil 60 minutes 21.02.2014 
ST4 Top Manager Statoil 60 minutes 06.03.2014 
ST5 Mid-level Manager Statoil 60 minutes 26.02.2014 
ST6 Top Manager Statoil 5 minutes 08.04.2014 
ST7 Top Manager Statoil 10 minutes 02.05.2014 
 
Figure 3: Overview of all interviewed informants.  
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5 Empirical Introduction 
 
This chapter describes how radical innovations have been important to the development of oil 
and gas as valuable commodities on the world market. Furthermore, the chapter outlines how 
institutional factors have been integrated into technology development after the industry 
engaged in petroleum activity on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. Finally, the chapter 
introduces some of the factors (challenges and opportunities) companies in the industry 
encounter in the selection of innovation initiatives. 
5.1 Introduction to innovation challenges in the oil and gas 
sector 
Petroleum is a general term to describe crude oil and natural gas that are nonrenewable mixtures 
of substances based on hydrocarbons usually referred to as fossil fuels. Petroleum established 
its position as a valuable commodity on the world market in the 1850s (Geo-Help Inc, No Date). 
Radical innovations like the modern oil well enabled exploration of oil and gas, the oil refinery 
allowed production and the cerocene lamp established a market to sell the commodity. The 
innovation enabling transportation of oil and gas by ship became the door opener to the global 
market creating the global commercial oil industry and by the turn of the 20th century, oil 
production arose internationally (Business & Economic Research Advisor, 2006). 
According to the theory on innovation management presented in chapter 3.1, path 
dependency and the following effects of path dependency, lock-in and lockout, in addition to 
NIH-syndrome and inertia are vast challenges to successful innovation selection in the oil and 
gas sector. The challenges inter-relate with each other and often arise at the same time if a 
company proves to have difficulties in handling one of them. For companies suffering from 
these challenges it is very unlikely to succeed in developing radical innovations. In the same 
chapter theoretical arguments identifies selection principles to counter these challenges by 
introducing external knowledge flows that can identify promising innovation initiatives. The 
argument set forth in chapter 3.4 demonstrates that selecting innovations accredited high 
opportuntites to succeed and a high risk of failure are measures to increase the potential of ROI 
from the innovation portfolio. Therefore, companies are stressed to withstand risk-taking and  
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experimentation in the selection of innovations 
 
Figure 4 presents a ranking of the total 
value score given each innovation factor across 
interviews with 38 informants. Each factor 
received the value 0 meaning the lowest, 0,5 and 
1 which was the highest value according to how 
strongly the informant emphasized interview. 
The length of the interviews vary as shown in 
Figure 3. The interview guide presented in each 
case study were different (see appendix). 
Therefore, the results in Figure 4 can only make suggestions to how each factor affects 
innovation selection. The innovation factors in Figure 4 with a white color are hindering 
innovation selection the higher percentage support they receive. The innovation factors in 
Figure 4 with a blue color have the opposite effect, and induces the selection of viable 
innovation initiatives the higher support they receive.  
Path dependency has been valued as the biggest challenge to innovation selection within 
the oil and gas sector across all the interviews. Furthermore, results from the interviews, 
regardless of organization, indicates that lock-in, lockout, inertia and NIH-syndrome are major 
challenges to innovation selection confirming that path dependency often leads to these effects 
as well. An interesting result, however, emerges from the lack of values given to 
experimentation, risk-taking and flexibility in Figure 4. Companies that have high levels of 
experimentation, risk-taking and flexibility within their organizations are more successful in 
identifying radical innovations (Chesbrough, 2003). These factors open up for external 
knowledge flows and external competency that affects the intra-organizational selection 
principles. Companies lacking these factors are increasingly path-dependent and incapable of 
identifying the innovation initiatives with the highest potential of success. The three case studies 
will analyse these findings into detail in order to gain a complete understanding of how the 
factors in Figure 4 affect innovation selection at GE Oil and Gas. 
 
 
Innovation Factors Total value score 
Path-dependency 61 % 
Lockout 53 % 
Lock-in 45 % 
NIH-syndrome 40 % 
Inertia 39 % 
Risk Taking 17 % 
Experimentation 12 % 
Flexibility/Fastworks 11 % 
Figure 4: Displaying total the value score of 38 
informants on innovation factors 
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5.2 Introduction to path-dependent behavior in the oil and 
gas sector 
The theoretical argument presented in chapter 3.1 emphasizes that it is especially difficult for 
large and established companies to recognize competing technology paths and to apply this 
technology for internal innovation. These companies have challenges in adapting to a new 
mindset from leading scientists dominating the new energy landscape. When narrowing the 
graph down to informants who have expressed the prevalence of path dependency in Figure 5, 
it is striking to see that informants from GE has the lowest percentage rate of informants per 
organization who has valued path-dependency as an innovation challenge in the oil and gas 
sector. A low percentage rate of path dependency enables the company to identify successful 
innovation initiatives based on technology from a competing technology path. 
Company Informants expressing path dependecy 
GRC 100 % 
Other 93 % 
GE 57 % 
Statoil 44 % 
 
At GE, informants expressing values of path dependency, refers to the customer’s 
reluctance in supporting radical technology. GE identify some customers in the sector to be 
path-dependent, this can lead to a lockout effect where it is very risky and costly for the GE Oil 
and Gas to develop radical technology. Furthermore, this increases GE’s difficulties to qualify12 
new technology and reaching the target of “proven” from customers.13 This seems to be 
especially difficult in the oil and gas industry, and is a barrier for GE Oil and Gas to select 
radical technology ideas. Here described by a mid-level manager in GE Oil and Gas:  
 
In the selection of radical innovation projects, cost and benefits have to be assessed, and the consequence 
of failure needs to be estimated. Just think about Macondo14 – the industry is allergic to risk. The sector will 
remain conservative – I am certain about that (GE14, 28.03.14).  
                                                 
12 Qualification of new technology is an institutional factor presented in Figure 9 and discussed in chapter 6.5.1.  
13 “Proven” is an institutional factor presented in Figure 8. Proven stands for the customers approval of new 
technology and will to take the technology into use.  
14 Macondo represents a gas release and subsequent explosion occurred on the Deepwater Horizon oilrig working 
on the Macondo exploration well for BP in the Gulf of Mexico. 11 people died, and hydrocarbons leaked into the 
Gulf of Mexico for 36 hours (EY 2014). 
Figure 5: Percentage value on path-dependency per company. 
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Informant GE14 from GE Oil and Gas clearly thinks that the risks of introducing new 
technology are higher than the benefits they can provide the industry. He describes the Macondo 
accident as a lockout effect reinforcing path dependent behavior in the oil and gas sector. In the 
competing technology path, climate change and environmental pollution15 is a reason to engage 
in technology development. In the new energy landscape with increased competition from other 
energy sources, selecting and succeeding with radical innovation initiatives can be paramount 
to deal with future problems facing the oil and gas industry. This informant from GE corporate 
emphasizes the need for a joint approach:  
 
Well, as the industry really faces the significant challenges of the future – going deeper, going offshore, 
going into unconventional reservoirs, going into harsh environments, there is a great need for increased 
technology. This challenge is almost by definition long-term in my view. This addresses, to me, one of the singular 
important problems in the oil and gas industry: We are driven, and the management of different companies are 
driven, by the 90 day cycle of Wall Street – what are your numbers, what are your costs this quarter, next quarter 
– if we’re lucky early next year. Therefore, the strategic direction and vision has been lost (GE16, 08.04.14).  
 
Informant GE16 perceives the industry as conservative and recognizes that the risks of 
developing technology to solve long-term problems have lead to a lock-in effect where 
companies spend resources on innovations with less risk dealing with short-term challenges.  
The challenges for selecting radical innovations seem to concern how GE Oil and Gas 
work with their customers and stakeholders. The next chapter will introduce Statoil, an external 
innovation collaboration partner to develop innovation initiatives on all three case studies. In 
addition, the section outlines how collaboration between the industry, the government and the 
academia has built the Norwegian Petroleum Industry. This background is important to 
understand why institutional factors affects the selection of innovations and how institutional 
factors on three levels can affect the selection principles at GE Oil and Gas.  
5.2.1 Development of oil and gas technology on the Norwegian continental 
shelf 
The Norwegian petroleum story began in the 1960’s after petroleum was discovered in the 
Netherlands. This discovery attracted the attention of international oil companies to apply for 
                                                 
15 That also includes oil spills. 
40 
 
concessions and soon the Norwegian government decided to establish formal macro 
institutions, national laws and regulations, to regulate Petroleum activity on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf. These institutions meant high taxation of potential revenue and fixed control 
of potential exploration activity after the discovery of the first oil field Ekofisk in 1969 with 
production beginning in 1971 (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2013). Important political 
and economic instruments ensuring social welfare and industrial growth were created when 
Statoil, the National Petroleum Directorate (NPD) and Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
(MOPE) were established in the 1970’s. The state applied regulations to slow down the 
distribution of concessions to international companies aiming to develop local content through 
education and training of Norwegians, and in turn build a domestic knowledge base to benefit 
from the petroleum industry. Local content was an effect of formal institutions and worked to 
counteract unemployment by creating jobs and developing a new local industrial capacity from 
a new competence base. Statoil, the national Norwegian oil company, became the predominant 
public instrument for ensuring and developing local content. Statoil used industrial networks 
for training and transfer of knowledge and technology to build a competitive Norwegian 
industry (Engen, 2009).  
The Norwegian model of controlling the petroleum industry, claiming taxes and 
distributing resources benefitting the vast majority of Norway’s population, became a radical 
way for governments to manage oil and gas exploration. The effect this model had on the 
Norwegian society and the construction of the welfare state was unique compared to any other 
oil producing country in the world. A mid-level manager from Statoil described this model as 
the most important radical innovation Statoil has developed:  
 
The one radical innovation from Statoil is how we have worked with the government and the local industry 
to construct a framework for innovation and local technology development. This model is unique compared to any 
other NOC16 in the world, and it has triggered sustainable growth to the Norwegian national economy. This is 
what we call the Norwegian model (ST1, 17.02.14).  
 
The Norwegian model required the creation of an entirely new infrastructure where Statoil itself 
contributed greatly. Informant ST1 emphasized Statoil’s choice to use local suppliers to develop 
technology and innovation as the key to trigger sustainable growth in Norway. A mid-level 
manager in GE Oil and Gas confirmed that if a customer complied with local rules and 
                                                 
16 Abbreviation for National Oil Company (NOC). 
41 
 
regulations emphasizing local content, this would affect how GE conducted innovation and 
technology:  
 
Governments often have a local content requirement for new field development17. This becomes a 
commitment by the operator to design a procurement strategy so that local suppliers can do a certain part of the 
scope of supply. As a supplier entering a new country, GE Oil & Gas must meet this requirement in various ways 
like e.g. placing low-tech basic steel fabrication jobs with local sub-suppliers and follow up closely to ensure 
quality. The hi-tech part of the scope and the overall design work will still have to be done from home. (GE1, 
18.02.14).  
 
Informant GE1 indicates that laws and regulations on a macro level can directly affect 
innovation projects by imposing GE Oil and Gas to use local content in the innovation process. 
The application of local content can enhance commercial viability in a number of ways. Local 
content can reduce exploration costs if the company hires a local workforce instead of paying 
salaries and transportation of expats. Local content can also reduce institutional risks by 
reducing local opposition through implementing measures to ensure that the local population 
receive benefits (Olsen 2014), ensuring a smooth operation in a developing country. In addition, 
local content coheres with idea of obtaining a social license to operate that has increasingly 
received more attention in the last years. In order to receive a social license, the oil company 
needs to perform petroleum exploration, extraction and production cleanly and sustainable 
(Siddiqi, 2014).  
For an industry based on extracting hydrocarbons, conducting business environmentally 
sustainable is very difficult. Developing this technology has proven to be extremely costly – 
companies are risking a combined lockout: Lockout from emerging technology paths, and as a 
result, a lockout from the new energy landscape.   
5.2.2 GE Oil and Gas as an embedded case study 
The entire GE-corporation has 300.000 employees working in more than 140 countries, but GE 
Oil and Gas has 43.000 employees operating in more than 100 countries and across seven 
business areas18. In the last three years, GE has invested more than 1 billion dollars on research 
and development (R&D) resulting in more than ninety new product launches in 2012 (The 
Economist, 2014). GE Oil and Gas performs innovation in three ways: through new production 
                                                 
17 Exploration of a new petroleum field. 
18 See the appendix for an organization chart of GE Oil and Gas. 
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innovation (NPI), new technology innovation (NTI) and internal research and development 
(ITR) (GE 5, 05.03.14). According to Vice President Rod Christie, the focus for GE when it 
comes to innovation is to work closely with customers, understand the challenges they are 
facing and develop technologies or solutions to meet their needs (The Economist, 2014). A 
senior associate accounts for this:  
 
If it is a strong business case and we have the competency available – we would like to develop the project. 
Earlier when only the technologists in both companies indicated that this was interesting, the projects often ended 
up into a solution nobody needed.  Today we have a stronger focus on a business case: That the project is well 
embedded in both companies (GE7, 28.02.14).  
 
Informant GE7 from GE Oil and Gas identifies the business case as a tool to facilitate 
innovation projects if a common business need exists in both companies. At the same time, this 
citation indicates that the business case is also a mechanism enabling customer collaboration 
and open innovation. Therefore, a preliminary proposition implies that the recent focus of using 
the business case as a selection tool at GE Oil and Gas can facilitate the selection of radical 
innovations based on the theory presented in chapter 3.4.  
 Another example where GE collaborates with stakeholders to develop innovative 
solutions are joint industry programmes (JIPs). JIPs are conducted together with two partners 
or more. According to the literature on PPM, sharing risks can enable ownership for the user 
and increase the possibility of developing a successful solution increasing the potential of return 
on investment. Both JIPs and the business case are selection principles that are favourable for 
GE if they want to convince the customer to engage in development of a radical solution based 
on technology from a competing path (Tidd and Bessant, 2009). For Statoil, the potential of 
including technological innovation across all business units makes GE a particularly interesting 
collaboration partner. In addition, GRC, a part of GE with competency across many R&D areas, 
possess expertise beneficial for on innovation projects (The Economist, 2014). The theory on 
open innovation recognizes the ability to open up for knowledge flows19 from different 
technologies as a prerequisite to identify radical innovation initiatives with a high potential to 
succeed. In the selection of radical innovations, this is especially important, since these ideas 
would be subject to innovation challenges complicating the screening process. Changing the 
work method towards the business case may be one reason why employees at GE Oil and Gas 
value path-dependency considerably lower than informants from other organizations.  
                                                 
19 See section 3.2.1 on open innovation. 
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The theoretical tools for managing innovation presented in chapter 3.4 emphasize that 
some formal routines of the innovation process is necessary. Allocating resources of the 
company between incremental and radical innovations can give a higher ROI across a portfolio 
of innovations. Basing the selection decision on knowledge from a variety of sources outside 
of the traditional economic ones may increase the possibility of success. In addition, multiple 
considerations of the innovations along the way is highlighted to reduce resource constraints. 
The theory also recognize radical innovations to arise outside of the formal procedure of 
innovation management (Tidd and Bessant, 2009). Consequently, the company should have the 
ability to catch these ideas and incorporate them into the Funnel, or create a separate Funnel for 
radical ideas. The business case and JIP’s are tools to ease innovation selection and facilitate 
radical innovations. The next chapters will analyse the proposition that institutional factors 
affects innovation selection strongly. Furthermore, the analysis examines selection principles 
GE Oil and Gas use to facilitate the selection of radical innovations. Finally, the researcher will 
present implications to how GE Oil and Gas can increase the potential of their innovation 
portfolio by developing successful radical innovations.  
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6 The Technology Cooperation Agreement 
(TCA) with Statoil 
 
GE has delivered equipment to Statoil since 1985. Over the last years, the relationship between 
the two companies has become tighter. Before, when the relationship involved less interaction, 
GE Oil and Gas developed this equipment through a closed model of innovation which has been 
described in chapter 3.1. Today, the theory suggests that GE Oil and Gas would develop 
equipment to Statoil through a more open model of innovation since they enjoy a closer 
customer-supplier relationship (Thoma et al., 2014). This embedded case study examines the 
Technology Collaboration Agreement (TCA) established in 2008 that is a formal agreement 
regulating inter-organizational collaboration. When the analysis refers to projects “on the 
TCA”, it refers to projects that are run between Statoil and GE regulated by the TCA. The 
agreement has become the overall platform for cooperation between the two companies and the 
TCA has been crucial to establish foundations for a relationship between GE and Statoil with 
increased interaction and communication in recent years (Thoma et al., 2014).  
Statoil see many opportunities in cooperating with GE and expects them to deliver the 
same quality on innovations from all business areas (Thoma et al., 2014). The TCA is an 
agreement with several terms and conditions, including clauses covering IP20, confidentiality, 
and user rights. The contractual clauses are created to remove formal barriers for technology 
collaboration (Thoma et al., 2014). These clauses are referred to as formal inter-organizational 
factors because they regulate how the two companies interact. The agreement has been 
successful in building trust between the two companies, and Statoil perceives GE as a strategic 
partner as opposed to “only” an equipment supplier. The two companies interact regularly 
through a number of informal and formal events where they can share knowledge throughout 
the year. The two companies enjoy an open and direct dialogue (Thoma et al., 2014). 
The TCA has four steeringcommittee meetings in a year. The steering committee 
meeting works as a selection principle where Statoil and GE Oil and Gas consider innovation 
initatives. The formal agreement has been initiated for a period of three years and then renewed 
for another three years. The agreement has a mandate to incorporate innovation initatives into 
an overall TCA project administration and separate focus areas. The focus areas targets 
                                                 
20 Intellectual property  
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innovation and technology development on areas of mutual interest for both companies 
including petroleum, shale gas and renewable energy. Renewable energy utilize technologies 
from a competing path in the new energy landscape. The agreement focus primarily on bilateral 
projects funded 50:50 by each part (Davies and Slagsvold, 2014). With the TCA, GE believes 
that sharing strengths in resources and technology with Statoil can enable both companies to 
achieve better results and to unlock a potential of added technology value to innovation projects 
if the companies are successful (GE Oil and Gas, No Date). The stakes are high, aiming to 
conceive selection principles that can introduce solutions to move mountains. The TCA has 
been created to provide an institutional framework to allow seed projects run and gain 
momentum through collaboration and investment. The agreement demands willingness from 
both parties to explore new technology paths and build a business case together. The objective 
has since the beginning been to generate an open dialogue to foster the best and brightest ideas 
and to increase enthusiasm in both companies (GE Oil and Gas, No Date). The following case 
study will analyse how innovation factors and institutional factors have affected the selection 
of innovation initiatives on the TCA. 
6.1 Analysis of innovation factors 
Innovation factors are divided into two groups: Challenges and opportunities. Figure 6 and 
Figure 7 gives an overview of the average score each informant from the three categories have 
valued eight innovation factors.  Maximum value per factor is 1 and the minimum value per 
factor is 0.  
 
 
0 0,05 0,1 0,15 0,2 0,25 0,3 0,35 0,4
Flexibility, fastworks or rapid prototyping
Risk-Taking
Experimentation
Average value of perceived innovation factor per informant
Innovation Factors
Other Statoil GE
Figure 6: Average perceived value on innovation factors. 
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Figure 6 indicates that GE’s employees value the challenges to innovation selection, 
path dependency, its effects lock-in and lockout, and inertia lower than informants from other 
organizations. GE Oil and Gas can leverage from a history of successful innovation 
introductions in other business units. Furthermore, the researcher observed an unwillingness of 
informants from GE Oil and Gas to criticise internal innovation initiatives in the interview 
setting. Furthermore, GE’s opportunity to include several technologies when selecting of 
innovations is emphasized by innovation literature in chapter 3.1 as a measure to counter 
innovation challenges in Figure 6.  
 
 
Compared with Statoil, GE has a lower awareness of innovation challenges and a higher 
awareness of factors considered positive for innovation selection, except for flexibility, as 
shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7. Consequently, the empirical information suggests that GE Oil 
and Gas should be able to identify radical innovation initiatives, possess the selection principles 
and have reasonable good chances of launching their iniatives with success. Still, the TCA has 
proven to be unsuccessful in developing radical innovation initiatives and therefore the analysis 
starts with flexibility – as the one factor where they have a lower score than Statoil. 
6.1.1 Flexibility 
The theory indicates that flexibility can be obtained by utilizing the “adequate tools” for 
innovation management. One tool is the Stage-Gate system that leaves little flexibility in the 
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selection of innovations. Another tool is The Funnel providing more flexibility and enabling 
the decision maker to consider resource constraints and re-order priorities between innovations 
throughout the process. The TCA consists of a number of formalized structures that are more 
complex than regular management systems for innovation projects. A top manager in Statoil 
expresses his opinion on how these structures have lead to improved innovations:  
 
The TCA has a bureaucratic management structure unlike other frame agreements and JIP’s (…) We 
need less complex management, faster contract negotiation and an easier commissioning practice than what we 
have today. Additionally we must focus on a few, high potential projects (good business cases) that have a high 
likelihood of being implemented (ST3, 21.02.14).  
 
The top manager from Statoil underlines flexibility as a major subject of improvement and 
seeks selection principles that are faster, simpler and less complex to succeed with innovations 
on the TCA. Furthermore, flexibility is lost when Statoil has limited resources to commission 
innovation initiatives. In addition, radical innovation projects have failed at meeting project 
objectives and have been abandoned after implementation of the new technology. A senior 
associate at GE Oil and Gas explains why they did not succeed:  
 
We have tried to develop some radical initiatives based on nano-technology. We were not very successful 
and the projects were abandoned (…). In one of the projects, we did realise that we needed to understand better 
the basic technology. With more time, we might have been successful. The project did not give the results we were 
hoping for – so we decided to shut down that one as well (GE7, 28.02.14). 
 
Informant GE7 clearly states that they have selected radical innovations. However, succeeding 
with radical innovation projects within short time limits, have been challenging on the TCA. 
Furthermore, informant ST3 emphasizes that the lengthy negotiations of terms and conditions 
(T&C) between Statoil and GE Oil and Gas have been a burden and could be one of the reasons 
why radical innovations have failed after selection. Consequently, the lack of flexibility on the 
TCA affects the selection of innovations negatively. Improvement of the rigid structure may 
facilitate the selection of radical innovations. Simplifying negotiations may enhance the 
potential to succeed with radical innovations on the TCA. 
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6.1.2 Path dependency, Lock-in, Lockout, Inertia and NIH-syndrome  
The case introduction and the innovation challenges presented in Figure 6 indicate that GE has 
a higher possibility to facilitate selection of radical innovations than other companies. For 
instance, GE has the ability to draw on technology from a variety of business units and to avoid 
lock-in and lockout. In addition, GE applies business cases21 in innovation selection that 
counters NIH-syndrome by accessing the core knowledge and the commercial dimension of an 
external partner. Therefore, answers from informants valuing GE Oil and Gas as path dependent 
needs to be examined to understand why the TCA has not been successful in introducing radical 
innovations.  
These informants describe GE Oil and Gas as path-dependent with a strong focus on 
acquiring technology companies. The theory defines path dependency as making decisions and 
acting them out based on previous experience. GE has a history of technology acquisitions and 
the company seems to have continued with this practice in the Oil and Gas business unit. The 
business unit consists of a number of recently acquired companies put together into one 
organization. A senior informant says «There have been many acquisitions with interesting 
technologies, and surely people can ask themselves the question whether they should stop now 
and try to develop something from the acquired companies”(GE7, 28.02.14). Informant GE7 
indicates that GE Oil and Gas is clearly marked of the high number of recent technology 
acquisitions. The focus of acquiring new technology companies instead of spending resources 
on internal innovation may have created a lockout effect from innovations based on technology 
from a competing path. Instead, the informant and the empirical information indicates that GE 
Oil and Gas has been locked into a path of acquiring technology companies being one reason 
why the TCA has not been successful to develop radical innovations.  
Several informants from GE Oil and Gas indicate that NIH-syndrome is a challenge for 
innovation collaboration with recently acquired companies. An informant describes his 
experience on the matter: “There is a danger that a lot of small kingdoms exist with the recent 
acquisitions, and they think they have to guard their territory- that can be a problem for 
innovation projects” (GE13, 27.03.14). Informant GE13 states that the recently acquired 
companies have not been eager to share their core technology. Innovation challenges closely 
relate, and the newly acquired companies may have been reluctant to share their technology 
                                                 
21 The business case is explained in chapter 3.4 where companies create an alternative selection principle for radical 
innovations.  
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with because new routines to manage innovation can meet resistance, or inertia, which is 
inherent in all individuals. Informants from GE Oil and Gas have indicated that inertia and NIH-
syndrome have delayed innovation projects. With the ambitious objectives of the TCA lies the 
potential of sparking inertia: “moving mountains”. The theory acknowledge that the creation 
and acceptance of radical ideas, assuming that radical ideas are needed to move mountains, 
require an environment open for external knowledge flows outside the company’s core area of 
expertise. An associate in Statoil describes in his words:  
 
The TCA has existed for some time without any major results, but I think it has been a learning process 
to identify the promising projects that both GE and Statoil can benefit from. I think we will see some of these 
projects in 2014, and we will have to find these projects as well to be allowed to continue on the TCA (ST2, 
10.02).  
 
Informant ST2 highlights how both parties, GE and Statoil, can learn from unsuccessful 
innovations and redeem stronger incentives to identify a business case as a common selection 
principle. Chapter 3.4 refers to the business case as a tool to facilitate the selection of radical 
innovations on one hand. On the other hand, the analysis has found that the business case is 
also a new path that can affect the selection of innovations on the TCA and reduce the risks of 
developing radical ideas by increasing their potential to succeed. 
6.1.3 Experimentation and risk-taking 
Several informants describe Statoil’s turn in cutting costs as a challenge to succeed with radical 
innovation initiatives on the TCA. Figure 7 presents GE Oil and Gas with a higher value on 
risk-take and experimentation than Statoil. Radical projects have higher risks, and often include 
experimentation of new technology outside the established path of the sector. Therefore, they 
also tend to be more expensive, however redeeming higher ROI if they are successful. The 
recent turn to cost-efficiency may explain why Statoil has a lower value on experimentation 
and risk-taking than GE. Statoil is the end user who takes the vast amount of risk with radical 
initiatives. At the same time, one of their main objectives with the TCA is to develop technology 
together with GE based on technology from other business units.  
A mid-level manager at GE Oil and Gas illuminates why GE can afford to experiment 
and take higher risks than Statoil:  
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We try to build confidence towards Statoil by explaining that this is something GE wants to work with, 
promote and stand behind. We are willing to share a risk of developing the project and we promote this towards 
Statoil because we are in a fortunate position regarding the overall access to resources at GE (GE10, 06.03.14).  
 
Informant GE10 explains that GE Oil and Gas are in a position to take risks. Lack of 
experimentation and risk-take from Statoil is a challenge to engage in innovations on the TCA. 
Despite of Statoils turn to cutting costs, they still aim to develop radical technology on the TCA. 
The analysis enhances the importance of taking risks and experimenting with technology from 
competing technology paths to improve the results of the TCA.  
Summary 
 
 Lengthy negotiations with Statoil on T&C’s and pressing time limits is a hinder to 
succeed with viable innovation initiatives. The analysis identifies a requirement for 
faster, simpler and more flexible tools to manage innovation selection. Implementing 
the business case is suggested to facilitate radical innovations by improving selection 
priniciples on the TCA and enhacing flexibility which the analysis has revealed to be 
challenge for innovation selection at GE Oil and Gas.  
 
 GE’s focus on acquiring technology companies in the oil and gas business unit creates 
challenges to innovation collaboration. Inertia and NIH-syndrome from these firms have 
been a hinder. These challenges can be reduced if projects are selected based on a 
common business need using experience from the first six years on the TCA.  
  
 For Statoil, the lack of will to experiment and take risks have been a challenge to 
facilitate the selection of radical innovation initiatives. GE Oil and Gas on the other 
hand can take more risk. The analysis suggests using past experiences to avoid major 
pitfalls can improve innovation selection and implement initiatives in accordance with 
the TCA objectives.  
 
 The analysis concludes that these difficulties alone are not the hinder for the selection 
of innovations on the TCA and furthermore the facilitation of radical innovations.  
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6.2 Informal inter-organizational challenges 
A master thesis has clear limitations on pages and time. Therefore the researcher has chosen to 
conduct an inter-organizational and intra-organizational analysis on this case study only, due to 
the possibility of many repetitive arguments. Implications regarding how macro institutional 
factors affect the selection of radical innovations is discussed in the two remaining case studies. 
Before addressing the first institutional analysis, it is important to remember that the formal and 
informal factors discussed throughout chapter 6-8 have been created to facilitate successful 
innovation initatives. Therefore, when they are are affecting the selection of innovations weakly 
or are affecting the selection of innovations negatively, this is stirring. 
The analysis begins with institutional factors affecting decision making at GE Oil and 
on an inter-organizational level. Do formal or informal institutional factors affect the selection 
of innovation initiatives strongly on the TCA? Figure 8 presents an overview of inter-
organizational factors affecting innovation collaboration between GE Oil and Gas and Statoil. 
The factors above the blue line represent informal institutional factors, and the factors below 
the blue line are formal institutional factors. The values have been calculated from the emphasis 
they were given in the interviews on a scale from -3 to 3, where 3 means that the factor has 
been heavily emphasized. Furthermore, if the informant meant that the factor affected 
innovation selection very positively, the value was doubled to emphasize these implications. 
The values presented in Figure 8 incorporate the average value across all informants per factor.  
Figure 8 implies that informal factors affect innovation selection a lot stronger than 
formal institutional factors. Furthermore, the values indicate that every institutional factor 
except for the “steering committee” and “GE delivering on time”, two formal factors, are valued 
to affect the selection of innovation initiatives positively. The theoretical suggestion based on 
institutionalism, that formal factors creates informal ties seems to add up with the results in 
Figure 8 where many informal ties have been valued as beneficial for innovation selection. At 
the same time, informants do not value formal factors regulating how Statoil and GE interact 
as very beneficial for innovation. Accordingly, it is interesting to see how institutional factors 
on an inter-organizational level affect the selection of innovation initiatives on the TCA. 
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6.2.1 Inter-organizational differences on what is “Proven” 
 “Proven” is defined as an informal factor because the concept have no precise or formal 
standard. It has variations depending on the customer-supplier relationship. Figure 8 indicates 
that gaining the customers approval, or “proof”, on new technology is severely affecting how 
GE Oil and Gas consider innovation initiatives. This coheres with the theoretical argument from 
PPM and institutionalism, that suppliers initate in customer collaboration to reduce risk on 
innovation projects. Risk is reduced from the suppliers side through receiving the customers 
consent on new technology. Statoil is often incorporated from the start on innovation projects 
and therefore it is reasonable to suggest that ”proven” strongly affects the selection of 
innovations. A senior associate at GE Oil and Gas explains the importance of receiving 
customer’s approval:  
 
“If the solution has been tested solely by GE – probably it is not good enough based on what you already 
have in the market and it can be very difficult if the technology is not proven. Statoil would probably like to be a 
witness to approving new technology as well” (GE6, 06.03. 14).  
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Informant GE6 describes collaboration and the customer’s approval as crucial to succeed with 
radical technology.  
Statoil thinks approval of new technology is important, but not to the same extent as GE 
according to Figure 8. Statoil is an operator with the opportunity to choose between several 
technology-suppliers whereas GE Oil and Gas relies on receiving Statoil’s approval to launch 
innovations and redeem ROI. Therefore, this institutional factor is very important to consider 
when GE Oil and Gas select innovation initiatives. The analysis suggests that a good customer-
supplier relationship may inter-relate to receiving Statoil’s approval of radical technology. 
Consequently, this factor can be crucial to facilitate the selection of radical innovations on the 
TCA and increase their potential.  
 
6.2.2 Establishing a good customer-supplier relationship  
The theoretical framework in chapter 3 is based on the notion that companies no longer perform 
closed innovation, but increasingly engage in open innovation with external partners. In Figure 
8, both companies agree that establishing an informal relationship of open innovation is 
affecting the selection of innovation initiatives strongly. Each customer-supplier relationship is 
unique and building an informal relationship enabling open technology discussions seems to be 
important, especially for Statoil according to Figure 8. They appreciate open and 
straightforward technology discussions, and therefore building trust with GE Oil and Gas on 
the TCA is crucial to achieve discussions on radical innovations. Neo institutionalism 
emphasizes that trust is a necessity to enable knowledge flows and learning to facilitate radical 
innovations on innovation collaboration. This underlines the statement in the case introduction, 
that the TCA has been a platform to grow a closer supplier-customer relationship. 
Inter-organizational theory implies that a lack of communication on innovation 
collaboration between two companies leads to a climate where it is difficult to identify 
promising innovation initiatives. Figure 8 indicates that Statoil values communication with GE 
as a factor strongly affecting innovation projects on the TCA. A mid-level manager from Statoil 
describes communication with GE Oil and Gas in this way: «I find it easy to communicate with 
GE, they are open and understanding” (ST2, 10.02.14). The theory on open innovation implies 
that informal interaction between two collaboration partners leads to improved selection 
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principles. Consequently, one can draw a conclusion that GE Oil and Gas and Statoil enjoy a 
very close relationship on the TCA promoting the selection of viable innovation initiatives. On 
one hand, this is essential to lay the foundations for radical innovations. On the other hand, 
perhaps this has taken the focus away from developing radical innovations. An employee in GE 
Oil and Gas shares his opinion on this matter: «Building the TCA was the first priority when I 
started in the job as Global Account Executive. The main goal was to create a communication 
arena on a management level” (GE9, 27.03.14). 
The TCA agreement has worked well to grow a healthy customer-supplier relationship. 
The factors discussed in this section, trust, open innovation and communication are valued to 
affect the selection of innovation initiatives strongly by both companies. The section has 
analysed theoretical arguments stating that these factors can enhance selection principles 
enabling the selection of viable innovation initiatives. The analysis indicates that this 
relationship has not facilitated the selection of successful radical solutions. Instead, the TCA 
has been successful to create a networking platform. The focus has to change towards 
technology development within both companies to facilitate radical innovations. The 
foundations for selecting radical innovations exist, but informal networking, interaction and 
communication between Statoil and GE Oil and Gas has to be directed towards technology 
development. 
6.2.3 Building the business case 
Figure 8 presents the business case as an informal factor since it has not yet been formalized 
into a selection principle on the TCA. It is rather an informal norm to how the companies could 
engage in innovation selection. Informants from Statoil have given the business case the highest 
value, and it is seen as a prerequisite for selecting radical innovation initiatives. A top manager 
in Statoil describes the business case as an enabler for radical innovations: «How can we 
facilitate that the (revitalized) TCA foster innovation and great technology steps? By identifying 
the right business cases – those that are dependent on ‘enabling’ technologies»» (ST3, 21.02). 
Informant ST3 clearly states that radical innovations can be enabled through a common 
business case drawing on Statoil’s need as an innovator (Thoma et al., 2014) and GE’s 
ambitions as a technology leader. This senior associate explains the business case from his 
perspective: 
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We have had too many projects that have failed in too poorly defined business cases. The technicians 
have expressed interest in projects, but we have not managed to identify the business need (…) On that area there 
is definitely a potential for improvement. (GE7, 28.02.14). 
 
According to informant GE7, selection principles considering innovation initiatives are greatly 
improved if innovations with technology solving problems for both firms are identified. The 
theory describes the business case as a separate “Funnel” to consider innovation initiatives in 
chapter 3.4. The question remains how Statoil and GE Oil and Gas can define a common 
business case considering innovation initiatives taking care of their common interests.  
An informant from GE Oil and Gas describes some challenges they face when they 
implement innovation initiatives, and how a business case may increase their potential:  
 
The main challenge is to identify a specific business case that is strong enough to implement across 
business areas and business units in GE.  When projects draws on technology across business areas there is a 
challenge that the projects infers the daily tasks of each employee – you need quite strong drivers to get people to 
do what it takes (GE9, 27.03.14).  
 
Informant GE9 recognize the obstacles for implementing an innovation project as twofold. The 
business case needs to be implemented based from a business need and it requires institutional 
factors providing strength to drive the project through business areas and business units at GE 
Oil and Gas. The analysis recommends GE to spend resources on formalizing the business case, 
to emphasize its importance and enable increased use of technologies from other business units 
on the TCA. This should be a priority to acommodate Statoil’s high expectations towards GE 
of applying technology from other business units.  
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Summary 
 The TCA has established effective and well-functioning informal ties leading to 
dynamic technology discussions. If both companies utilize the intimate relationship 
to develop viable innovation initiatives instead of a networking platform, the 
analysis indicates that the TCA can facilitate radical innovations.  
 
 By spending resources on formalizing the business case as a selection principle, GE 
Oil and Gas could create separate guidelines to select radical technology based on a 
common business need. This would strengthen radical innovation initiatives and 
ease internal innovation collaboration across business units and business areas. If 
both companies were successful in aligning the formal business case as a principle, 
it would increase the potential of radical innovations to succeed. 
 
 Approving new technology is a priority for both companies on the TCA. Involving 
Statoil into the early phases of the Funnel should be a priority for GE Oil and Gas 
to increase their to receive approval on new technology. This would directly 
facilitate radical innovation initiatives on the TCA and increase their potential to 
succeed.  
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6.3 Formal inter-organizational institutional factors 
Only a few formal institutional factors were emphasized to strongly affect innovation selection 
on the TCA in Figure 8. Furthermore, Statoil and GE had a similar perception of informal 
factors, while the formal factors can show to vast deviations. One the one hand, formal inter-
organizational factors can be more relevant in other phases of the Funnel. On the other hand, 
misalignement between the intention of the formal factor and the reality to how they affect 
behaviour can be a reason to these differences. Therefore, this chapter aims to analyse in-depth 
how institutional factors affect innovation selection.  
Certification of technology mainly applies to innovation in the third phase of the Funnel 
after the technology has gone through testing. Informants may have valued this factor in the 
interviews because it strongly inter-relates to some of the other institutional factors. 
Certification of technology can be one way of gaining customer-approval for radical 
technology.22 Furthermore, if this factor is improved and valued stronger through the early 
phases perhaps it would facilitate the selection of radical innovations on the TCA.   
6.3.1 The formal TCA design  
Obstacles may arise when two companies engage in collaboration. Inter-organizational 
institutionalism argues that if these obstacles are too vast compared to the output each company 
receives back they will withdraw from collaboration. Terms and conditions are often subject to 
negotiation before an innovation is up for screening.  NDA23 and IPR24 are two contractual 
clauses integral to regulate how Statoil and GE Oil and Gas interact on the TCA. The idea is 
that pre-negotiated terms and conditions on the TCA can enable dynamic technology 
discussions. Both companies regard the formal TCA design as positive for the selection of 
innovations. Statoil has valued IPR and NDA as factors strongly affecting the choice of 
innovation initiatives positively in Figure 8. An associate from Statoil explains: «The TCA 
encourages experimentation. You know each other well on the TCA, you have good relations 
and the framework is in place in the sense of IPR and NDA» (ST2, 10.02.14). Informants share 
                                                 
 22 Referring to the factor «proven» on an inter-organizational level. 
23 NDA: Non Disclosure Agreement 
24  
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the perception that IPR and NDA affect the selection decision, but not to the same extent as 
Statoil. This requires further analysis. 
 
6.3.2 The formal selection principles on the TCA 
A formal institutional factor on an inter-organizational level should regulate interaction so both 
companies receive higher benefits from collaboration than separately25. Furthermore, the 
formal factor should effectively allocate resources across a balanced innovation portfolio with 
viable radical and incremental projects26. Statoil see the steering committee meeting as 
problematic for innovation and they may regard these formal factors to be a constraint on their 
internal resources. A mid-level manager in Statoil describes it in this way: 
 
 You've got some complicated management systems for TCA projects. If you agree with a department 
manager at GE on a project, then you have to write a paper on the project to receive endorsement from the steering 
group: Then it goes to the procurement department of both companies. One must go through an additional link 
(ST5, 26.02.2014).  
 
Informant ST5 states that the steering committee is a timeconsuming and complicated selection 
principle. The researcher observed that the steering committee worked as a principle to push 
innovations forward since this is where they would go through a screening process on the TCA.  
In the observation, the steering committee affected informants to focus on solving obstacles to 
innovation due to a forth-coming deadline. The results in Figure 8 and informant ST5 indicates 
that the steering committee is a vast challenge to facilitate radical innovations due to stringent 
routines that may lead to loss of balance in the portfolio27.  
GE’s employees do not regard the steering committee meetings to affect innovation 
selection substantially.  The steering committees are describes as integral to manage innovation 
initiatives. It is a selection principle directly used to select innovations. Furthermore, the 
steering committee is responsible for value creation on the TCA and it consists of the top-level 
management in Statoil and GE Oil and Gas. It is a extremely challenging to innovation selection 
that formal selection principles cannot identify viable innovation initiatives. According to the 
                                                 
25 According to the institutional arguments on an inter-organizational level. 
26 According to the theoretical arguments presented on PPM.  
27 Since none radical innovation initiatives have been introduced by GE Oil and Gas in the last six years, it is 
presumed that they have not been developed on the TCA either. 
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literature on PPM, formal management tools in the early phases of the Funnel should not be too 
stringent and they should reduce risk. The DARPA model presented in chapter 3.5 have a similar 
objective as the TCA: conducting radical innovations on a short time scope with participation 
of talented people. The DARPA model has been successful by using temporary teams with 
highly skilled collaborators. Perhaps, the steering committee meeting can incorporate some of 
the methods used at DARPA and enhancing the incentives for innovation collaboration instead 
of an impediment. On the one hand, changing single members of the steering committees may 
lead to imrpoved innovation initiatives. On the other hand, the steering committee drives 
innovations forward. Consequently, a selection principle with a similar function to the steering 
committee can enable progress in innovation initiatives, but the routines this factor creates 
needs to be improved to facilitate the selection of radical innovations. 
The T-session is considered to be helpful, but neither Statoil nor GE have valued this as 
a selection principle strongly affecting innovation selection according to Figure 8. The 
informants explains that they have attended several of these events, without leveraging 
substantial accomplishments.  
The steering committee meetings and the T-session are formal factors that have 
demanded vast resources without providing the expected results. From improvement, they 
could affect the selection of innovation initiatives stronger. This argument is especially relevant 
for radical innovations where innovation selection becomes increasingly difficult, and the 
selection of promising ideas is even more challenging. The use of stringent tools involves the 
loss of flexibility, a vast challenge to facilitate radical innovations on the TCA according to the 
analysis in section 6.1.1. Consequently, new selection principles used to select innovation 
initiatives can give better results and enhance potential ROI of the innovation portfolio. 
6.3.3 GE delivering on time 
Theory introduced in chapter 3.4 says that time-consuming innovation projects can lead to 
economic decline if innovations fail and this means waste of resources and high costs. 
Accordingly delivering on time is closely associated to risk, which is a vast challenge to 
facilitate radical innovations.    
In Figure 8, GE’s incapability to deliver innovation projects on time has been valued 
negatively by Statoil. Informants from GE does not share Statoils perception to the same extent. 
Innovation projects are time-consuming and if one of the parties fail to deliver, risk increases 
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and imposes higher resource constrains for the other party28. Furthermore, If projects are unable 
to keep reasonable time scope they may become more costly and resource demanding. For 
Statoil, who are currently cutting costs, this may be an obstacle to innovation collaboration. 
Neo institutionalism claims that companies stop engaging in collaboration with other 
companies when the constraints are higher than the benefits. An informant from Statoil 
describes it like this:  
 
When we collaborated with Wellstream before they became a part of GE, everything used to be quick and 
easy. Now, however, they have competency in a scope that they did not have before. We have experienced this on 
a project that we tried to implement on condition monitoring. There are many people involved in the project that 
we have to relate to. At the same time, too many cooks spoil the broth. It takes time and everybody has to agree on 
something that is agreeable for everyone: GRC in Niscayuna, GE in Norway and GE in Newcastle (ST5, 
26.02.2014).  
 
Informant ST5 understands that quick decisions can be difficult to implement in a large 
organization like GE. At the same time, he expresses this to be frustrating. Informants from GE 
Oil and Gas value their ability to deliver on time slightly positive on the TCA. This informant 
from GE Oil and Gas describes one of the reasons why:  
 
I think the TCA shortens the time in the upfront evaluation. The TCA surface the right projects and allow 
for a quickly evaluation on management levels and allow the project to move forward because we have many of 
the currents pre-negotiated versus negotiating over and over again within each project (GE15, 10.04.14).  
 
Informant GE15 emphasize a positive relationship between pre-negotiated contractual clauses 
on the TCA and GE’s ability to deliver on time. The researcher observed that GE Oil and Gas 
did not manage to deliver everything they had agreed in an innovation project with Statoil. 
When Statoil remarked this, the researcher found under the next observation that GE Oil and 
Gas had taken care of the request. GE’s inability of delivering on time needs to be analysed 
further in the intra-organizational analysis since this matter concerns how GE Oil and Gas 
develop innovation initiatives internally. 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 According to literature on PPM presented in chapter 3.4. 
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Summary 
The analysis on formal inter-organizational factors, written rules regulating how two companies 
interact, have indicated some interesting propositions: 
 
 The pre-negotiated terms and conditions on the TCA enhances technology 
collaboration. 
 
 The formal selection principles, the steering committees and workshops,  are hindering 
the selection of innovation initiatives on the TCA. Formal factors regulating innovation 
collaboration have been time-consuming, resource demanding and have proven poor 
results. Statoil see these selection principles particularly challenging to facilitate radical 
innovations. The analysis indicates that the steering committee needs to be improved 
yielding better results, if not the companies may withdraw from innovation 
collaboration in this form. 
 
 The formal factors have led to a collaboration climate where every informal factor are 
valued to strongly affect innovation selection. This leads to a suggestion that changing 
and improving some of the formal factors may facilitate the selection of radical 
innovation initiatives on the TCA.  
 
 GE’s inability to deliver on time needs to be improved. The analysis indicates that this 
requires a further examination on the intra-organizational level. 
6.4 Informal Intra-organizational analysis  
Until now, the TCA analysis has indicated that many answers to how selection principles can 
facilitate radical innovations are found on the intra-organizational level at GE Oil and Gas. 
Furthermore, Figure 9 demonstrates intra-organizational factors to have a lower value 
compared to inter-organizational factors by informants from GE. In this level, informal factors 
are valued to affect the selection of radical initiatives stronger than formal factors. Figure 9 
implies that mainly formal factors are valued to negatively affect innovation selection. There 
seems to be a lot of improvement to how formal institutional factors affect innovation 
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management. Figure 9 presents informal intra-organizational factors above the blue line and 
formal factors beneath the blue line. The values have been calculated likewise the values 
presented in Figure 8, and presents the average score of informants from GE Oil and Gas. 
 
Figure 9: Intra-organizational factors at GE affecting innovation selection. 
6.4.1 Top management support from the CEO  
Institutionalism says the empowered entity in question can create institutional factors and give 
them meaning. The top management in a company can establish intra-organizational 
institutional factors and assert them with a meaning, for instance an internal norm implying that 
each employee who works overtime is a hard worker. The TCA has received top-management 
support from both companies which can crucial to encourage the decision maker to take risks 
and experiment in the selection of innovation initatives.  
A top manager at GE describes CEO Jeff Immelt’s view on technology development 
with Statoil: «Jeff Immelt said he wanted a couple of super technologies with Statoil. Statoil’s 
management also wants to achieve something grand» (GE9, 27.03.14). Informant GE9 implies 
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that Jeff Immelt wants breakthrough technologies to be developed on the TCA. Furthermore, 
in the last year GE’s top management has introduced measures to show their support to the 
TCA. A top manager in GE underscores one informal mechanism:  
 
Last year, six oil companies were chosen by GE as Corporate Strategic Accounts. This has significantly 
increased the focus on Statoil among stakeholders on all levels in the organisation. Jeff Immelt has 15 Strategic 
Accounts across the entire GE corporate. Statoil was chosen from a potential of becoming a technology leader. 
They are not our biggest customers, however (GE9, 27.03.14).  
 
Informant GE9 clearly states that GE’s top-management recognize Statoil as an important 
customer. Institutionalism claims this to be a powerful factor enhancing commitment to fulfil 
the TCA’s unresolved potential and deliver profitable radical solutions with technology from a 
competing path. At the same time, the top management is pressing for radical innovation 
initiatives and have perhaps not succeeded in leveraging this understanding through the entire 
organization given the scarce results on the TCA and the difficulties innovation initatives have 
encountered internally at GE. Institutionalism indicates that professionals within the 
organization have a jurisdiction to change the working logic of an institutional factor. The next 
paragraph will analyse this factor. 
6.4.2 Professionals with an academic education in a position of power 
Intra-organizational institutionalism asserts that professional employees with an academic 
background possessing a distinct jurisdiction are in a special position to shape the 
implementation of formal institutional factors into the organization. According to Figure 9, they 
affect innovation collaboration between Statoil and GE Oil and Gas. This analysis redeems to 
figure out which professionals, how they affect innovation selection and why. 
Several informants have indicated that specific professions within GE complicate 
innovation projects on the TCA. Five informants, four from GE Oil and Gas and one from 
Statoil, have valued professionals with an academic background to strongly affect the selection 
of innovation initiatives. A top manager expresses his view:  
 
GE has a reputation of being “difficult” to work with in negotiations of legal and commercial T&C’s. 
Lawyers and commercial managers in the different businesses have not been aligned and we have “overwhelmed” 
customers with comments to their contract proposals. For Statoil we have now developed a tool and a process to 
ensure alignment and “un-necessary “commenting” going forward (GE9, 27.03.14). 
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Informant GE9 indicates that professionals directly affect innovation projects on the TCA. At 
the same time, he points to communication as a means for dealing with this challenge. Despite 
pre-negotiated contractual clauses settled beforehand, a practice of time-consuming discussions 
of legal terms and conditions exist. After these dynamic discussions, some informants perceive 
the time it takes to process legal matters by academic professionals working in the legal 
department as a hindrance for the selection and implementation of radical innovations. The 
informants are divided two to three regarding howlegal professionals affect the selection 
decision positively or negatively. A senior associate, however, describes the academic 
employees as the biggest bottleneck to collaborate across business units on innovation projects:  
 
Can we utilize technology other business units are developing? Well, then they would have to look at their 
agreements – and that is not easy. It is not easy to take projects on a short notice, many things have to be dealt 
with, especially not violating any legal agreements (…) Reaching an agreement is tiresome and time-consuming. 
It is the biggest bottleneck (GE7, 28.02.14).  
 
On the one hand, it is crucial for GE not to violate terms and conditions on the TCA because 
legal they leverage GE’s commercial viability. This may be the reason why three informants 
from GE have valued the academic professionals as an important factor in the selection of the 
innovations. At the same time, the lack of flexibility and the challenge these professionals have 
on settling agreements is a vast difficulty to facilitate radical innovations. Consequently, it is 
concluded that legal practices within GE is strongly affecting the selection of radical 
innovations on the TCA. Furthermore, to some extent they are also a challenge to succeed with 
radical innovations. 
 
6.4.3 Cross-sectional collaboration and inter-company communication 
This section analyses how cross-sectional collaboration affects innovation selection. The ability 
to perform innovation initatives across business units was expressed by Statoil as one of the 
main reasons to engage in a TCA with GE Oil and Gas. Furthermore, the section analyses how 
inter-company communication and personal networking affects innovation collaboration. The 
possibility to draw on technology from multiple areas is one the benefits GE have compared to 
many competitors in the oil and gas sector. 
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Cross-sectional collaboration and difficulties in cross-sectional collaboration emerged 
as distinct patters in the collection of data and the proposition that these factors strongly affect 
the selection of innovations at GE Oil and Gas can largely be verified. Cross-sectional 
collaboration have been given two contradictory normative meanings by informants on the 
TCA. Furthermore, Cross-sectional collaboration enhances innovation initiatives and facilitate 
radical innovations because disparities in knowledge, competency and technology are healthy 
to foster radical innovations. This abundance of knowledge counters challenges to innovation 
selection according to open innovation theory. A senior employee at GE Oil and Gas describes 
his experience from cross-sectional collaboration; «It is not easy to find the right person on 
innovation initiatives across business units, and one is dependent on a personal network. I think 
the latter is very important» (GE7, 28.02.14). That GE7 engage in informal collaboration across 
business units can enable identification of viable innovation initiatives. Difficulties expressed 
by GE7 has is a barrier to cross-sectional collaboration. 
Another informant from GE Oil and Gas emphasize that GE is a very large organization 
and that personal networking often is the most efficient way of finding the right people to 
engage in collaboration with (GE17, 11.03.14). In addition, informant GE5 explained in the 
interview (5.03.14) that no formal routines for identifying collaboration partners exist and 
therefore a lot of collaboration transpire from informal networks. GRC has appointed a Business 
Program Manager (BPM) to manage cross-sectional collaboration at GE through formal and 
informal factors. The BPM is applied to establish a contact point between GRC and the business 
units. An informant describes the BPM position in this way:  
 
The job of a BPM is not to create a bottleneck and centralize all the communication through himself, but 
rather find and connect the right people at GE Oil and Gas and GRC that can then create their own channels of 
communication. You can formalize it much more, and we have tried that as well: The experience is that 
formalization and centralization of the communication is not the way it works (GRC8, 18.02.14).  
 
Figure 9 indicates that the BPM has managed to create informal ties for cross-sectional 
collaboration, however these ties have not overcome the vast difficulties to engage in cross-
sectional collaboration at GE. GRC have talented scientinsts working at their research facilities 
and have launched several radical innovations on other business areas. Increasing their 
involvement could be benefical to facilitate radical innovations. An informant shares his 
experience from cross-sectional collaboration:  
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“We have common procedures within Oil and Gas that enable collaboration(…) It is natural for us to 
communicate directly with other business areas within the GE Oil and Gas business unit since we have many 
common interfaces and they are near us organizationally”(GE3, 27.02.14).  
 
Informant GE3 indicates that cross-sectional collaboration works well for business areas at the 
oil and gas business unit where communication occurs naturally from intensive interactions. 
The analysis suggests that it can be difficult for GE Oil and Gas to facilitate successful 
innovation initiatives when the project draws on competency from other business units. 
Furthermore, the links towards GRC should provide increased expertice on radical technology 
with a high potential to succeed. The analysis suggests that difficulties in cross-sectional 
collaboration arises when innovation collaboration is performed across business units.  
The theory on intra-organizational institutionalism emphasizes that informal factors 
may be crucial to achieve good performance on innovation projects. According to Figure 9, 
employees at GE values inter-company communication and personal networking to affect the 
selection of innovations highly. Communication skills seems to be extremely important when 
cross-sectional collaboration is conducted on innovation projects:”You need to be a good 
communicator and an influential leader to ensure that someone who does not report to you still 
can make something you need happen” (GRC8, 18.02.14). Informant GRC8 underscores 
communication to be a drive for efficient cross-sectional collaboration. This chapter can 
conclude, however, that the informal institutional factors for cross-sectional collaboration are 
well functioning, yet insufficient in enabling GE Oil and Gas to meet the objectives of the TCA.   
Summary 
 The top management has recently imposed measures (which?) to enhance the 
importance of innovation initiatives on the TCA. The analysis implies that this has 
not been aligned throughout GE’s organization since vast difficulties to cross-
sectional collaboration still exists.  
   
 Cross-sectional collaboration is integral to meet the objective of using technology 
from other business units at GE. It can facilitate the selection of radical innovations 
and at the same time increase the potential of GE’s innovation portfolio. Cross-
sectional collaboration seems to work well within the Oil and Gas business unit, but 
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vast difficulties occurs when employees engage in collaboration with other business 
units.  
 
 Time-consuming negotiations conducted by professional employees working with 
legal terms and conditions are a bottleneck for innovation.  
 
 Despite the high value score of informal factors, the TCA is unable to develop 
successful radical innovations. The chapter has addressed formal institutional 
factors as the main challenge for innovation selection.  
 
6.5 Formal intra-organizational factors 
A manager or the corporate management can create formal procedures or routines that 
employees have to follow. This section analyses how formal factors at GE affect the selection 
of innovation initiatives and if they facilitate the selection of radical innovation initiatives. 
According to Figure 9, informants from GE have given these factors very different value scores 
to how they affect innovation selection.  
6.5.1 Formal factors inducing selection of viable innovation initatives 
Qualifying technology has the highest value score of formal intra-organizational factors in 
Figure 9 and it inter-relates to many institutional factors (e.g. the business case, proven and 
TRL-level). Qualifying technology is an internal procedure often involving customer 
participation. The associate from Statoil accounts for this:  
 
When it comes to technology development (…) it is currently more important for us to get the same output 
at a lower cost than higher output but at a higher price. An overall assessment of cost versus benefits will decide 
if we go for a new solution and the technology must be qualified before it can be taken into use (ST2, 10.02.14).  
 
Informant ST2 emphasize that for Statoil, qualification reduces the risk of pooling resources on 
innovation without receiving ROI. Companies use the TRL-scale to assess the technological 
readiness level of a new solution. An employee in GE Oil and Gas refers to TRL-level in this 
manner:  
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For Statoil, a solution is proven29 when it reaches TRL level four30. It does not have to be field proven, 
but the solution has to go through a sequence of qualifications and tests. A standard exist to regulate qualifications 
and tests in order for the equipment to reach this level (GE13, 27.03.14).  
 
Informant GE13 clearly states that Statoil relies on a number of institutional factors (e.g. 
standards, tests and qualifications) to assess if new technology is ready for use. This underscores 
the strong value asserted to qualify new technology affecting the selection of innovation 
initiatives at GE Oil and Gas positively. According to institutionalism, it can be critical that 
employees engage in qualifying technology to facilitate the selection of radical innovations, if 
not this institutional factor that is crucial for innovation loses its significance. Involving the 
customer from early phases innovation and engaging them into qualification may increase the 
potential to succeed with radical technology.  
     Institutionalism says that internal procedures can enable employees to engage in cross-
sectional collaboration if they are influencing their behaviour. In Figure 9, “Formal procedures 
for innovation collaboration” has a low value and does not affect innovation selection. The 
BPM is for instance a formal procedure for innovation collaboration (In addition to the 
facilitator of informal connections) and a contact point for employees at GE Oil and Gas to gain 
knowledge on technology developed elsewhere in the organization. A senior associate describes 
this function: «I use the BPM as a connection point to other business units. I go to the BPM for 
Oil and Gas and I ask him if GRC has performed any research on this area. How this works 
has been depending on the person in the position.” (GE7, 28.02.14). Informant GE7 stresses 
that the BPM can be increasingly helpful for driving technology enquiries and establishing 
cross-sectional collaboration.  
According to institutionalism, a lack of formal routines to facilitate fast integrations 
where effective cross-sectional collaboration runs efficiently hinders GE’s performance to meet 
the TCA objectives. The analysis emphasize the importance of qualifying technology, TRL-
levels and formal procedures for the selection of innovation initiatives. These factors seems to 
be especially critical to facilitate radical innovation initiatives. Through improvement they can 
facilitate innovation initiatives with a higher potential to succeed. 
                                                 
29 The citation refers to “proven” as an institutional factor. 
30 An overview of the TRL scale is presented in the appendix. 
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6.5.2 Knowledge Sharing Incentives and Training Policy 
In Figure 9, GE’s employees value their training policy highly. One employee describes GE’s 
training policy:  
 
GE has an excellent training policy. You are not expected to transfer from technical work to manager 
work without support or training. The training involve courses on communication, coaching, mentoring and so 
on. It is extremely valuable (GE14, 28.03.14).  
 
Informant GE14 has experienced that GE’s training policy is working well. GE offers courses 
so that employees can enhance their knowledge on areas outside of their core expertise. 
Furthermore, training their employees in soft skills alike communication is an objective with 
internal courses (GRC8, 07.02.14). According to literature on innovation management, 
organizational learning and the exposure of employees to external knowledge flows31 increases 
the ability of strategic decision making enabling selection of viable innovation initiatives. There 
is still a lot of improvement to enhance how knowledge sharing incentives and training policy 
affects GE’s innovation performance on the TCA. An associate at GE Oil and Gas describes 
how GRC facilitate viable knowledge sharing activities:  
 
GRC organize internal conferences where they present their own technology. GRC is very skilled at 
reaching out to the different business units and presenting their work (…) The is responsible of transferring 
knowledge of technology between GRC and GE Oil and Gas (GE11, 10.03.14).  
 
Informant GE11 suggests that when the employees take GE’s formal routines on knowledge 
sharing and training policies into action, they are well functioning. These factors enable the 
selection of radical innovations and can increase their potential to succeed. Furthermore, the 
two formal factors discussed in this section are well-functioning and not the reason why the 
TCA has been unsuccessful to develop innovation projects based on radical technology. 
6.5.3 Factors without an effect 
Figure 9 presents compliance programs and bonus incentives32 as formal institutional factors 
not emphasized to affect innovation selection. The theory on PPM acknowledge financial 
                                                 
31 Refers to open innovation presented in section 3.2.1. 
32 See Figure 9 presenting the values from the interviews. 
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reward incentives to motivate employees to take risks facilitating radical innovations. None of 
the informants appointed the bonus-system to be a specific goal enhancing radical innovations: 
“What I am basically saying: We do not have a direct bonus system that rewards risk, we have 
opportunities to reward risk that are left to the individual criteria of managers” (GRC8, 
18.02.14). Consequently, the current bonus system does not seem to affect the selection of 
innovations on the TCA.  
Compliance programs are internal programs and policy decisions a company makes in 
order to meet the standards set by government laws and regulations. According to macro 
institutionalism, companies can reduce institutional risks in areas with unstable and 
unpredictable institutions by spending resources on these programs. In Figure 9 they are not 
valued to affect the selection of innovation initiatives at all, perhaps they are more important in 
other parts of the Funnel. Consequently, the analysis can approve on the results in Figure 9 
where these factors are not affecting innovation selection at GE Oil and Gas.    
6.5.4 Formal factors affecting innovation selection negatively 
The inability of GE to deliver on time was emphasized as a factor that needed further analysis 
in the section discussing inter-organizational factors. Statoil emphasized that intra-
organizational time-consuming routines and GE’s inability to come up with quick responses 
obstructed innovation initiatives on the TCA. An informant describes how time has affected 
innovation projects on the TCA on the intra-organizational level:  
 
What we have discussed a lot with GE is that things take time. They haven’t been very coordinated 
internally (…) There are units that are overloaded in work, especially on the legal aspect, that affects things to 
take a lot of time (ST2, 10.02.14).  
 
Time-consuming routines to process legal matters have been a common characteristic to 
institutional factors affecting innovation selection of the TCA. When things take too much time, 
the momentum after the dynamic technology discussions is lost and this has been a bottleneck 
to succeed with innovation projects.  
The technology discussions are working well, the formal layout of the agreement is well 
embedded in both companies, but when the innovation projects aims to draw on technology 
from other business units internally at GE Oil and Gas- it takes to much time and it becomes 
increasingly difficult to deliver on schedule. An informant from GE describes innovation 
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collaboration in this way: Innovation collaboration across business units does not happen very 
often, when they do however, they seem to be very challenging because each business area is 
managed under a separate Profit and Loss Centre (P&L) (GE5, 06.03.14).  
Informant GE5 suggests Profit & Loss Centers to challenge intra-organizational 
innovation collaboration. The informant implies that each business area have their own Profit 
& Loss budget and that cross-sectional collaboration interferes with the everyday working logic 
of employees at GE. The theory says that this working logic can easily be changed by an entity 
of power if the institutional factor is aligned through the organizational. The analysis reveals 
that P&L’s are a challenge for innovation collaboration across several business areas. The 
motive may be that the individual cannot see how his business area gains when another P&L 
will get the majority of ROI when the project is successful. The analysis has found that informal 
factors align the importance of a decision to affect the work logic performed by employees 
within an organization. Consequently, the poor relation of P&L’s and time regarding the 
selection of innovation initiatives at GE can be improved through communication and increased 
interaction. 
Summary 
 The analysis suggests that GE should involve Statoil into the early phases to enable 
qualification of new technology. This may facilitate radical technology since Statoil, the 
customer, is already committed to innovation through the TCA.  
 GE’s internal training policy and knowledge-sharing activities are well functioning and 
possess the quality needed to facilitate radical innovations.  
 Despite GE’s focus of being a “technology leader”, most formal intra-organizational 
factors are not encouraging innovation – instead they are hindering the selection of 
innovation initiatives. “Toll-gates” and the BPM is insufficient to enable cross-sectional 
innovation and achieve the potential GE Oil and Gas has to facilitate radical innovations. 
 Time and P&L’s have an undesirable effect for innovation initiatives on the TCA. Time 
inter-relates to academic professionals, late delivery of equipment and time-consuming 
cross-sectional collaboration that has vast resource constraints internally at GE.  
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 The analysis has found that the bottle necks for the selection of innovation initiatives 
lies internally at GE Oil and Gas. Perhaps revitalized selection principles can improve the 
results with successful innovation initiatives on the TCA. 
 
73 
 
7 Gas discovery in Tanzania 
 
This case study analyses how GE Oil and Gas prepares for a future delivery of advanced 
technical equipment to Statoil concerning exploration of gas in Tanzania. The case study 
analyses how innovation challenges and macro institutional factors will affect the selection of 
innovation initiatives to a developing country with high institutional risk. In addition, this is the 
first time GE Oil and Gas will deliver equipment to Tanzania. How does GE Oil and Gas 
perform the selection of innovations in this context? Furthermore, will this project facilitate 
radical innovations and can it increase the potential of the innovation portfolio? 
No formal agreement has been signed between GE Oil and Gas and Statoil for this 
delivery. If Statoil takes a final decision to carry on with the project, they are going to need 
technical equipment for an offshore installation plant and an onshore processing facility in 
Tanzania. Statoil does not require the use of radical technology for this project, and are only 
looking for a buyer before initiating the final decision whether or not to carry out a full-scale 
gas exploration project (Blas, 2013) 
Statoil is an International Oil Company (IOC) owned 67% by the Norwegian state 
claiming to use local content as a commercial principle. If Statoil as an operating agent takes a 
clear stand to comply with local laws and regulations in Tanzania, GE Oil and Gas would follow 
their lead33. Statoil has become an experienced exploration agent of oil and gas with an 
international presence in more than 27 countries. Unfamiliarity with institutions on a macro 
level leads to increased risk to introduce innovation into the market according to 
institutionalism. Local governments may impose laws and regulations for the operating oil 
company to use technology reducing CO2 emissions or set strict demands to build local content 
in order to receive a social license to operate. Companies reduce institutional risks through 
compliance and creation of local content (PFC Energy, 2013). If the local population do not 
benefit from extraction of oil and gas social unrest and local opposition can arise, like in Congo 
and Nigeria for instance (Fouche and Koranyi, 2013).   
Statoil has discovered natural gas in reservoirs located on very deep waters, between 
2300 and 2600 meters in depth. The technical challenges offshore involves engaging in a subsea 
environment with high pressure and low temperatures, which in turn can lead to the formation 
                                                 
33 See citation of GE1 on page 41. 
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of hydrates in the pipeline. This is a vast challenge to gas exploration since hydrates can lead 
to clogging of the pipeline and potential environmental disaster (Helgesen, 2013). The 
reservoirs are located 100 km offshore complicating the transport of gas to a processing plant 
onshore. Only a decade ago, this exploration was considered impossible. The uncertainty is 
related to how the underlying water, called aquifers, and the risk of water production will affect 
exploration. The field has an estimated recovery rate from 60 to 80 percent recognized as one 
of the in its best class. This will be the deepest gas discovery to this day and advanced technical 
equipment will be placed on great depths. The technical risks with this project can be solved 
with current technology (Helgesen 2013), but qualifying this equipment to prevent gas leaks on 
deep oceans becomes increasingly important.  
Tanzania is crucial for Statoil because it represents its most promising investment 
opportunity to engage in development of natural gas outside of Norway (PFC Energy 2013). 
For Statoil it is important to explore natural gas to offer “clean” fossil fuels as an alternative to 
renewables in the future energy landscape. For both companies this project represents an 
opportunity to use concepts from the competing technology path if radical technology can be 
developed to reduce CO2 emissions and exploration costs to a minimum. 
The plan is to process natural gas in an LNG plant placed onshore Tanzania together 
with another oil company, BG Group. The process facility will apply technology to compress 
natural gas into liquefied natural gas (LNG), enabling export to markets in Asia. Institutional 
factors on a macro level, both formal and informal, are forecasted to play a crucial role in 
Tanzania. Especially the upcoming elections in October and the current revision of the gas act 
may be a challenge. The large gas discoveries over the past two years have brought the country 
to revise its national oil and gas policy. Norwegian government officials in NPD and MOPE 
are assisting the Tanzanian government with this job (OD1, 19.02.14). In addition, local 
opposition to both the regional and global export of natural resources has resulted in recent 
violent clashes. BG Group has therefore announced that the project may progress slower than 
anticipated. In addition, economic challenges remain and the new industry demands an 
infrastructure that is not yet in place. It creates safety risks and additional costs for security 
(PFC Energy, 2013). 
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7.1 Innovation challenges: Path dependency, lock-in, 
lockout, inertia and NIH-syndrome 
Path dependency evolves from previous experience and can affect the decisions a firm makes34. 
Accordingly, the possibilities of path dependency to challenge the innovations GE Oil and Gas 
will offer and perhaps utilize are seemingly low because the company has never conducted 
business in Tanzania before. An associate in GE Oil and Gas explains the situation: 
 
All experience used in Mozambique will be used for our go-to-market plan in Tanzania. We will maybe 
use the same high-level strategies, but from a tactical point of view, obviously it is different (…) There is a 
difference in maturity in how those countries can exploit their oil and gas resources (…) and maybe expanding 
that question for East-Africa to West Africa. We have a lot of experience from Angola and Nigeria that we can 
leverage for Tanzania (GE4, 07.02.14).  
 
Informant GE4 implies that GE Oil and Gas is considering several strategies when they are 
going into a country where they have never conducted business before. Hence they do not have 
previous experience to develop path dependent behaviour from. At the same time the company 
is operating in the region and have the opportunity to build expertise on experience from other 
markets. Furthermore, absence of path dependency to leverage experience for this project may 
be a challenge for technology development. Statoil has not yet taken a final decision to go 
through with the project or not. Therefore, the analysis of path dependency is only plausible for 
this case study. The reinforcing effects of path-dependency, lock-in, lockout and NIH-
syndrome, can only be analysed after Statoil’s final decision and are excluded from this case 
study.  
Technical installations offshore do not require radical innovations, but Statoil indicates 
that incremental innovation to existing equipment is necessary. A mid-level manager at GE Oil 
and Gas describes his view regarding implementation of radical technology in Tanzania: 
 
The only thing that can lead to a technical leap is a solution leading to cost reduction and that increases 
the value of the field. If you can find a completely new solution which saves for instance a platform… the 
Subseafactory35 is a radical solution in this sense, and some elements of it has already been qualified for use (GE1, 
18.02.14).  
                                                 
34 Path dependency is explained in chapter 3.1. 
35 A subsea factory is a process plant on the seabed making it possible to utilise remote-controlled transport of 
hydrocarbons at any offshore facility STATOIL. 2014. The subsea factory [Online]. Available: 
http://www.statoil.com/en/technologyinnovation/fielddevelopment/aboutsubsea/pages/lengre%20dypere%20kald
ere.aspx.. 
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Informant GE1 does not exclude opportunities for radical innovations in Tanzania, but he 
emphasizes qualification of innovations as a necessity to enable successful introduction of a 
radical solution. Qualifying new technology is resource demanding and requires the consent 
and participation of a customer – Statoil in this case, where 57% of the informants have valued 
their organization to be path-dependent. Furthermore, informant GE14 emphasizes on page 38 
that utilizing radical solutions offshore have become increasingly difficult after the Macondo 
accident in 2010. In Figure 4, path dependency is considered as the greatest challenge to the 
selection of innovations. Furthermore, the industry is pressured to develop cost-effective 
solutions for offshore operations. The analysis suggests that path-dependency will probably 
lead Statoil to decide to use a current technology if they go through with the exploration of gas 
in Tanzania. In addition, the analysis implies that this may obstruct Statoil or GE Oil and Gas 
to develop technology that can be applied in the new energy landscape, since this technology is 
not costly sustainable or environmental friendly compared to future requirements. However, it 
is too soon to tell if path dependency will affect the selection decision strongly.  
Statoil and GE Oil and Gas seem to express inertia towards the application of solutions 
in the competing technology path. According to Figure 6, both Statoil and GE Oil and Gas 
indicate lower values on inertia than other informants. Informant GE1 implies that the subsea 
factory is a radical solution currently under development that can replace a platform requiring 
new infrastructure. At the same time, Statoil does not recognize a demand for radical 
innovations because sufficient technologies already exist both onshore and offshore. If the 
supplier recognize a problem they can use radical technology to solve, the supplier can use the 
business case, fast tracks and open innovation as selection principles to convince Statoil to share 
the risks of engaging in innovation initiatives. Consequently, the analysis assumes that path 
dependency and inertia are challenges to choose viable selection innovation initiatives in 
Tanzania. The analysis has identidied tools from the theory to counter some of these challenges. 
A final decision is not yet taken and the subsea factory is only tests and qualifications from 
usage. The next part of the analysis will examine the remaining factors from Figure 4; 
flexibility, risk taking and experimentation – which are identified to facilitate the selection of 
radical innovation initiatives.  
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7.1.1 Flexibility, risk taking and experimentation 
Figure 7 indicates that GE Oil and Gas has a higher value regarding experimentation and risk-
taking than Statoil. Statoil, the customer and the operator, has lower values and at the same time 
higher responsibilities associated to extraction of gas in Tanzania. A senior associate at GE Oil 
and Gas comments some of the problems associated to use of equipment with a risk of technical 
failure:  
 
A common problem is to introduce something completely new to a subsea development. One issue is that 
a system failure or similar may have an effect on overall production, even if qualifications have been undertaken. 
An example could be for a “remote location” with limited onshore facilities and/or infrastructure; The concern 
is, what if something happens or what if something is not working as intended even if tested and qualified for use. 
This may impact the field development or the production (GE2, 10.03.2014).  
 
The informant demonstrates a number of practical and well-defined reasons for not taking risks 
offshore in Tanzania. Taking risks and experimenting in Figure 7 does not seem to affect the 
selection of innovation initiatives at GE Oil and Gas greatly. For Statoil, collaborating with GE 
Oil and Gas seems to be beneficial in order to reduce risk and gain access to knowledge and 
competency they do not have themselves. Engaging in a partnership may facilitate radical 
innovations enabling the companies to consider innovation initatives through a different lense, 
identify new business needs and reduce the risk of failure36. It is too early to conclude which 
technical solutions Statoil will use in Tanzania. The unwillingness to take risk and experiment 
has a potential of becoming a challenge for innovation selection in each company individually, 
but in an innovation collaboration, these challenges are defied. 
The theory on institutionalism acknowledge that companies that adapt to environmental 
conditions and integrate these efficiently into the organization develop more successful 
innovations. PPM suggests management tools to handle these changes and ensuring flexibility 
as a necessity to facilitate radical innovations. In Figure 7 GE Oil and Gas has a lower flexibility 
score than Statoil. Consequently, the lack of flexibility can be a challenge to the selection of 
innovations for GE Oil and Gas in this case. In the interview with GE4, he expresses that 
innovation and how the business in a new country is built does not necessarily relate to 
innovation at GE Oil and Gas (GE4, 08.02.14). The analysis indicates that flexibility and fast 
iterations where external environmental conditions are quickly integrated into the internal 
                                                 
36 According to the literature on open innovation and inter-organizational institutionalism, as well as PPM. 
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organization of GE Oil and Gas have the potential of challenging the selection of innovation 
initiatives intended for Tanzania. At the same time, it is difficult to judge at this stage what will 
happen down the road. No formal agreements have been signed and the risks of starting the 
process of developing radical technology seem to be too high for the moment.  Furthermore, 
when Statoil makes the final call to invest in a full-scale gas exploration project in Tanzania the 
innovation challenges discussed in this chapter will be largely reduced.  
Summary 
 Radical solutions exist and can be taken into use in Tanzania. The analysis reveals that 
path-dependent behavior from resource constraints are a challenge to innovation selection. 
Inertia in the oil and gas sector after the Macondo accident is a vast challenge to select and 
succeed with radical technology. Consequently, this project does not seem to facilitate 
radical innovations.  
 
 The risks of implementing radical technology in Tanzania are higher than the benefits 
they would give compared to existing technology. The lack of flexibility at GE Oil and Gas 
to integrate new environmental conditions in Tanzania quick and efficiently is a challenge 
to succeed with innovation initiatives when entering a new country. Accordingly, GE Oil 
and Gas should focus establishing formal and informal routines to enhance adaptability and 
to reduce the risks of failing with technology introduction.  
7.2 Macro Institutional Challenges 
The research question proposes that macro institutional factors strongly affect selection of 
innovations in Tanzania. This statement has a strong theoretical foundation in macro 
institutional theory. Figure 10 presents an overview of all macro institutional factors derived 
from interviews with 38 informants. Formal institutional factors are dark blue, and informal 
institutional factors have a light blue color. Figure 10 demonstrates that several macro 
institutional factors are valued highly of the informants to affect innovation and technology 
development in the oil and gas sector.  
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Figure 11 presents an overview of informants 
from GE Oil and Gas who mentioned one of all the 
macro institutional factors to affect innovation selection 
during the interview. The factors above the blue line are 
informal factors, and the factors below the blue line are 
formal factors. Figure 11 shows clear distinctions from 
Figure 10. Of the nine informants at GE Oil and Gas who 
mentioned macro institutional factors, local conditions 
were emphasized to heavily affect technology 
development. None of the informants described public 
perception or time to affect the selection decision. 
Therefore, it will be interesting to see if the proposition adheres to the results revealed in the 
following analysis. 
 
 
Figure 11: Average value score for 9 GE employees who mentioned macro institutional factors in the interview. 
7.2.1 Local conditions 
Local conditions refers in Tanzania creates issues relating to involving a population with low 
human development, high socioeconomic challenges and difficulties in executing and 
maintaining a stable legal and judiciary system (Fouche and Koranyi, 2013). Exploration of 
fossil fuels in Tanzania requires Statoil to commit to a country over a long period. Their 
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investments are therefore vulnerable to abrupt changes in local conditions. According to macro 
institutional literature, local conditions can strongly affect the outcome of an engineering 
project in the natural resource industry. Increased knowledge on local conditions may indicate 
which projects GE Oil and Gas should choose to allocate their resources on.  
If Statoil decides to go through with the operation in Tanzania, they can expect to remain 
in the country for 35 - 40 years (ST7, 02.05.14). For equipment suppliers, this impose a 
requirement of a local presence to complete service and maintenance on request. Therefore, 
local conditions have proven to affect ROI on technical installations strongly, and this has been 
the case for other oil and gas companies operating in Africa as well (Fouche and Koranyi, 2013). 
An informant from INTSOK expresses his view about the matter: 
 
 
The oil and gas sector is far from labor incentive and will only require a limited number of employees. 
Local conditions will not be particularly important for the oil companies because they work offshore and the 
employees onshore will be mainly highly qualified staff. (…)The onshore facilities will be operational for decades 
to come and the locals will therefore increasingly see the benefits. Initially the people outside of the fence will be 
wondering if they will benefit from the exploration at al. They will, but they will need to be patient (IN1, 07.02.14).   
 
Informant IN1 indicates that Statoil’s operation in Tanzania will not be affected by poor local 
conditions because exploration of gas is carried out offshore or behind a fence protected from 
the local conditions. According to informant ST1 on page 40, Statoil was responsible of 
introducing a business model where local companies became involved in technology 
development through re-educating and retraining. The informant describes it as the single 
radical innovation Statoil has introduced, and the question remains if they would do the same 
in Tanzania, a country with poor local conditions. In addition, informant IN1 implies that 
Tanzanias population will wonder when they can gain gas exploration, and managing their 
expectations (Olsen 2014) is one way to handle the risk that local conditions represent for future 
ROI on innovation projects.  
 Macro institutional theory clearly states abrupt change in local conditions to increase 
institutional risk that is recognized by PPM theory and neo institutionalism to affect the 
outcome of innovation projects. An informant from Statoil describes how they perceive local 
conditions: 
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It is clear that there are greater challenges in Tanzania than in other countries. This country has just 
started with exploration of gas. It is a poor country and education is not best in class. In addition, there are only 
a few persons with vast experience from the oil and gas sector (ST7, 02.05.14). 
 
Informant ST7 emphasizes that local conditions in Tanzania is recognized as a challenge by 
Statoil. In addition, the government of Tazanias limited experience with petroleum can become 
a challenge. Figure 11 shows that informants from GE Oil and Gas values local conditions to 
be the macro institutional factor affecting innovation selection the strongest. In Tanzania local 
conditions may change with the current revision of of the gas policy (Fouche and Koranyi, 
2013), furthermore the upcoming elections in October may lead to unstable and unpredictable 
local conditions. This instability can cause local conditions with riots, revolts or rebellions, and 
therefore the next chapter will perform an analysis of how laws and regulations affects the 
selection of innovation initiatives intended for Tanzania. 
7.2.2 Laws and Regulations 
The macro institutional theory asserts that laws and regulations, and hereby policy, passed by 
governments affect how company behave in innovation. Figure 10 presents an overview where 
more than 60% of the informants value laws and regulations to affect the selection of innovation 
initiatives within their companies. Accordingly, this is the formal factor with the strongest 
response from the informants of all macro institutional factors analysed in this thesis. Currently, 
instability in laws and regulations are a main challenge to conduct gas exploration in Tanzania. 
The PSA37  act regulating exploration of natural gas is awaiting a revision and a final decision 
by the national assembly. The revised legal system for gas exploration will probably not be 
passed until after the Presidential election in October this year (Zawya, 2014). An employee in 
the Petroleum Directorate describes the situation in this way:  
 
Tanzania is in a position where they have outdated legislations and they have started a process to develop 
new rules and regulations. Statoil’s PSA will be affected by the current changes, since they have signed an 
agreement on terms and conditions. How the oil companies behave varies. Some are proactive and interact with 
the government (OD1, 19.02.14). 
 
                                                 
37 The PSA is a Production Sharing Agreement that Statoil has signed with Tanzania’s state owned oil company to 
produce gas offshore of Tanzania’s coast. 
82 
 
Informant OD1 emphasizes that laws and regulations are factors strongly affecting how 
companies selects innovation initiatives. Figure 11 presents results where laws and regulations 
are also valued to affect the selection of innovations at GE Oil and Gas. If Statoil complies with 
laws and regulations, this will also affect how GE Oil and Gas considers these factors in 
Tanzania according to informants GE1 on page 41. Regarding innovation selection, the 
literature and the empirical research indicate that laws and regulations have a high effect on 
innovation in the oil and gas sector. An employee at GE Oil and Gas explains in his words how 
they assess political risk, these also comprising laws and regulations:  
 
How much money does GE has to spend, and how much are we expecting in ROI? In reviewing a business 
case there is an element of institutional risk as well. My job is to review the financial returns and technical 
feasibility. Institutional risks are considered on another level (GE11, 10.03.14.)  
 
Informant GE11 indicates that GE Oil and Gas consider institutional factors in their selection 
principles, but not at his level. This implies that laws and regulations have not been realigned 
or is not supposed to be considered on all organizational levels. GE1 states that GE Oil and Gas 
will considers compliance in their innovation initiatives stronger when they are entering a new 
country if the operator takes a clear stand to comply. The proposition that laws and regulations 
affect innovation at GE Oil and Gas is confirmed, however they tend to affect the selection of 
innovation initiatives stronger when the customer is imposed by the authorities to comply with 
local rules and regulations.  
7.2.3 Corruption 
Tanzania is ranked number 111 from all countries in the world on the corruption perception 
index (International, 2014). Corruption is defined as dishonest or fraudulent behaviour 
conducted by those who have power (Oxford Dictionaries, 2014). The theory on macro 
institutionalism asserts that existence of corruption affects whether or not companies are willing 
to engage in investments in a country. In Figure 10, corruption is valued to affect innovation 
selection. An informant does not describe corruption in Tanzania as critical for operating oil 
companies:  
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Oil companies are used to work in countries with more corruption than Tanzania and they have policies 
in place to limit the risk and exposure. Progress may be slow in many countries and it could be tempting to pay to 
move the approval process through the system. 10-15 years ago, that might have been the solution, but global and 
local anti-corruption legislation has emerged. (…) Oil companies have access to decision makers that will 
understand the importance of swift decisions. The whole supply chain will benefit from this (IN1, 07.02.14). 
 
Informant IN1 suggests that corruption is not a vast risk for ROI to companies in the oil and 
gas sector in Tanzania. At the same time, the informant indicates that corruption is strongly 
affecting how oil companies behave in Tanzania. For GE Oil and Gas, corruption has resulted 
in a number of internal mechanisms suggesting that anti-corruption is important:  
 
We have good training systems for everyone who works at GE: The anticorruption work is certainly 
included in these systems and there are mechanisms and checkpoints on every level of the business. There is no 
excuse for noncompliance (GE9, 22.01.14). 
 
Informant GE9 suggests that anticorruption work is a priority everywhere GE Oil and Gas 
conducts business. According to informant IN1, the sector may benefit from personal 
connections with the Tanzanian government enhancing swift decisions. In addition, Figure 11 
shows that corruption does not affect the selection of innovations strongly. The analysis 
suggests that this is the case because GE Oil and Gas have efficient routines that take care of 
anticorruption. Furthermore, high levels of corruption in Tanzania is not affecting how GE Oil 
and Gas select innovation initiatives.  
7.2.4 Agreements and Time 
An agreement is a formal institutional factor implemented by the authorities and encompassed 
in a document regulating how companies behave in Tanzania. Statoil has signed a PSA with 
the Tanzanian government enabling them to explore and produce natural gas. The gas policy 
regulating this agreement is currently subject to revisions and this can strongly affect Statoil’s 
final decision to engage in exploration of gas in Tanzania. In addition, and this has been 
mentioned throughout the chapter – the contents of the agreement may impose requirements on 
Statoil regarding type of technology taken into use in the project. Accordingly, this factor 
constitute an institutional risk for GE Oil and Gas on efforts made to deliver technical 
equipment to this project. A senior employee at INTSOK describes it like this:  
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In this case, they are exploring gas. When will Statoil and GE initiate the final decision to extract gas? 
Are there any advantages in the early phases? What happens if the competitors establish an office and we do not? 
Most suppliers will probably enter the Tanzanian market early and employ a couple of locals to do administrative 
work and to function as a source to collect information (IN1, 07.02.14).  
 
Informant IN1 indicates that Statoil’s decision to stay in Tanzania will affects how suppliers 
choose to invest their resources in order to win the contract. At the same time none of them can 
be certain of winning the contract.  
The Tanzanian national assembly may use a lot of time to pass the PSA legislation, and 
this strongly affects Statoil’s final decision to engage in exploration of gas. According to the 
PPM literature, time-consuming decisions sets innovation under higher resource constraints and 
increases the risks of failing with technology development. Informant IN1 describes this: 
 
Do not forget about time. You have a population who do not see any significant fast benefits. For instance, 
the ongoing construction of the pipeline in Tanzania has led to demonstrations because the local population 
wanted to stop the construction. They wanted to keep the gas to themselves, and several local villagers were shot 
and killed by the military (IN1, 07.02.14). 
 
Informant IN1 gives an example where time can becomes a challenge to gas operations in 
Tanzania. The informant indicates that the inability of the Tanzanian government and industry 
to manage rising expectations can lead to severe circumstances posing high institutional risk. 
Internal compliance programs can be a means to reduce these risks38, but they demand resources 
and time to align throughout GE’s organization.  
The PSA agreement between Statoil and the Tanzanian authorities can affect innovation 
selection at GE Oil and Gas strongly. Time-consuming decisions regarding laws and regulations 
passed by this agreement is valued stronger in Figure 10 than in Figure 11 indicating that this 
is more important for Statoil than GE Oil and Gas. The theoretical proposition that agreements 
affect innovation selection on a macro institutional level at GE Oil and Gas is confirmed in this 
paragraph. In this sense, time closely relates to creation of local content that will be discussed 
in the next section. 
 
 
                                                 
38 These are meionted in chapter 3.3.1. 
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7.2.5 Creating local content 
The creation of local content is emphasized by macro institutional literature, by several 
informants, by documents and from observations (12.03.14) to reduce risks emerging from 
institutional factors in areas with high institutional risk. It can be especially useful in a market 
where the company never have conducted business before. Furthermore, both the macro 
institutional theory and data gathered from observations and interviews regards the creation of 
local content to be increasingly important in developing countries, because local conditions are 
a high risk for innovation. Creating local content can be a method to reduce local opposition to 
exploration of natural resources, theft and corruption. These problems have arisen from other 
African countries subject to exploration of oil and gas (Fouche and Koranyi 2013). The macro 
institutional theory recognize institutional risks to be as a vast challenge when operations are 
conducted in developing countries since institutions in these countries are often more 
unpredictable. The main problem of using local content described by a senior associate in 
INTSOK:  
 
A huge capacity building and training program will be required in the years to come to prepare local 
enterprises and local labour to participate in the activities. The government in partnership with the oil companies 
and the education sector will have to look for ways to build industrial competency (...)It will have to become part 
of the upgrading of the country’s education system that will be necessary to provide candidates for future 
employment (IN1, 07.02.14).  
 
The local authorities impose companies to create local content in Tanzania. At the same 
time, they can have their own compliance programs to enhance local content when enter a new 
country. For instance, employing local competency instead of spending resources to hire expats 
can reduce costs and at the same time reduce institutional risks. Furthermore, Figure 11 
indicates that the creation of local content is a priority at GE Oil and Gas and valued to affect 
the selection of innovation initiatives. Again, informant GE1 on page 41 suggests that one way 
local content can affect innovation at GE Oil and Gas is by creating a production facility or 
hiring local people to work on innovation projects. Informant IN1 emphasizes difficulties to 
create local content in Tanzania since the country lacks knowledge and competency that can be 
leveraged. Furthermore, he implies that local content will only benefit a few who are hired to 
work for the oil and gas sector. Of the selection at GE who speaks of macro institutional factors, 
creating local content is valued higher than the average for all informants. Still, the strong 
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theoretical and empirical emphasis on the creation of local content is not reflected in the 
interviews. Only 30% of the informants values this to affect innovation selection strongly. A 
top manager at GE outlines his thoughts on local content:  
 
Regarding local content in Tanzania, it depends on the contract and how much we will have to use. At 
the end of the day, it depends on how experienced the local expertise is. In Tanzania however, I guess, we would 
not really use local content (GE17, 11.03.14).  
 
Informant GE17 indicates that GE Oil and Gas will consider local content if they are imposed 
to do this by formal macro institutional factors. Furthermore, the analysis has disproved the 
proposition that local content in developing countries strongly affects innovation selection at 
GE Oil and Gas in Tanzania. 
7.2.6 Forums, public perception and communication with local population 
Formal institutional factors on a macro level seems to be affecting innovation selection strongly 
much due to the high risks of conducting business in a developing country. This section will 
discuss two informal factors to manage the institutional risks emerging from formal institutional 
factors and one factor, forums, where companies can engage in informal interaction with 
individuals, companies and authorities.  
Institutionalism emphasize communication as a means to affect how individuals or 
groups of individuals behave. Only a few informants highlighted communication with the local 
population as an important means to turn the public perception in favour of gas exploration in 
Tanzania. Informant SI1 could however encounter for open forums to be an effective means to 
interact with the local population, manage their expectations and to reduce institutional risks. 
These three macro institutional factors have not been valued to affect innovation selection 
strongly in Figure 10. The motive could be that these factors affect every phase of the Funnel 
instead of the selection principles in partidular. Informant ST7 describes some of the methods 
Statoil applies when they interact with the local population: 
 
When you enter a new country, several components have to be taken into account. These include training 
and economic support of initiatives and academic courses, educating students and local companies on standards 
and safety used in the oil and gas industry. Several steps are included in this assessment and they may change 
over time (ST7, 02.05.14). 
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Informant ST7 describes several methods that Statoil use to interact with the local population 
influencing their public perception of gas exploration. According to Figure 11, GE Oil and Gas 
does not emphasize these factors to affect the selection of innovation initiatives. Consequently, 
the analysis is not supporting the proposition that Forums, public perception and 
communication with the local population affect innovation selection strongly. The theory 
enhances that these factors could be crucial to reduce institutional risk and thereby facilitate 
radical innovations. However, this seems to be more relevant for Statoil than GE Oil and Gas. 
Summary 
 The analysis has revealed that the current revision of the national gas policy and the 
upcoming elections in Tanzania represent vast institutional risk factors with strong effects 
on innovation selection. These institutional factors may increase instability and institutional 
unpredictability and can be a decisive factor whether Statoil decides to carry out the 
operation or not. 
 GE Oil and Gas and Statoil are not using vast resources to reduce institutional risks in 
Tanzania by creating local content, communicating with the local population and managing 
the public perception. Low expectations of local conditions affecting innovation and 
implementation of new technology, and strong linkages between the oil and gas industry 
and the authorities may be reasons why these factors are considered to be unimportant in 
selection of innovation initatives. 
 The analysis suggests that Statoil and GE Oil and Gas could benefit from increased 
efforts to reduce institutional risks in Tanzania through compliance and the creation of local 
content. Despite operations offshore or behind a fence, local conditions in Tanzania have 
led to opposition and violence striking large engineering projects. By increasing the focus 
on compliance and engaging in communication with the local population, GE Oil and Gas 
stands in a stronger position to reduce the risk of failing with new technology. 
Consequently,  
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8 Gas and Oil Implementing Agreement  
 
The IEA was founded to help industrialized countries coordinate a collective response to major 
disruptions in oil supply (International Energy Agency, 2014). Together with GE Oil and Gas 
and four founding countries, the IEA has established the multilateral agreement; The Gas and 
Oil Technology Implementing Agreement (GOT IA) in 2013. The main objective with the GOT 
IA is to bring key decision makers and innovators from the government, oil and gas companies, 
research communities and NGO’s under one agreement to share knowledge and competency. 
The aim is to create a global dialogue to discuss R&D, technology gaps, and operating practices 
to accelerate innovation and improve the safety, sustainability and public acceptance of 
hydrocarbon operations (GOT IA, 2014).  
The GOT IA is a selection principle reducing risks of failing with radical technology 
development and execution. Decision makers come together in an informal setting to make 
policy suggestions and to agree upon technology gaps directing technology development. Each 
technology gap addresses a task area where an oil company is responsible to foresee the 
technology development. The agreement aims to develop technologies associated to long-term 
commitment and inherently lead GE Oil and Gas into a new energy landscape where the focus 
on reducing CO2 emissions and costs related to oil and gas exploration is becoming increasingly 
important. The GOT IA is still in the early stages, with the launching conference in New York 
back in October 2013 (Karlsen and Doucette, 2013).  
This embedded case study was conducted on the second meeting in Florence on the 8th-
10th of April 2014. The regulatory framework with the effects this agreement may impose on 
innovation selection are still unknown and difficult to anticipate, but the founding parties behind 
the agreement have high ambitions to fill technology gaps in the oil and gas sector (Karlsen and 
Doucette, 2013). The analysis will use data gathered from observations, interviews under this 
meeting, presentations, notes taken underway and the rich sources of other data material. GE 
Oil and Gas believes that addressing the technology gaps through regulatory and policy drivers 
in a collaborative and open manner can lead to outcomes that support the optimum development 
and use of hydrocarbon resource (Karlsen and Doucette, 2013). The Norwegian Minister of 
Trade and Industry emphasized that when the industry cannot compete on costs, the industry 
has to create new knowledge and develop technology to meet this challenge. In this respect, 
succeeding with promising innovation initatives with a high potential to succeed is paramount, 
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and the local government has a responsibility to help companies with this objective (Mæland, 
2014). The GOT IA is an example of a selection principle that can enable this vision and 
facilitate radical innovation initatives solving some of the major challenges facing the industry.  
8.1 Technology and innovation challenges on the GOT IA 
Figure 12 presents the general opinion expressed by 13 
informants interviewed under the meeting in Florence. 
The Figure represents a pattern retrieved from these 
interviews and summarized and visualized into 
challenges that the emphasized by the informants. The 
formulation of the interview guide and scarce time may  
have affected the results in Figure 1239. The researcher 
was only given 5 minutes per interview. The vast 
majority of these informants were interviewed under the 
third case study in Florence. Then one can ask the question if this is an opportunity or an 
obstruction? First of all, these informants indicate a high level of awareness of innovation 
challenges within the industry. Secondly, it will be interesting to see how they assess the GOT 
IA and how this will affect innovation selection and in turn the facilitation of radical innovation 
initiatives.  
All five task-areas have identified technology with a potential of resulting in radical 
transformations and giving the inventor a commercial advantage in the new energy landscape 
e.g: elimination of gas flaring, unmanned production facilities and novel drilling concepts 
(Wiencke, 2014). The researcher performed participant observation during this case study and 
was included on a workshop on clean and safe hydrocarbons. The overall impression of the 
researcher was an unwillingness to address the technology gaps with radical technology. 
Instead, a common characteristic remained to address the challenges through incremental 
improvements to existing technology and by creating informal and formal ties (institutional 
factors).  
                                                 
39 The interview guide can be found in the appendix. 
Challenge Value score 
Path Dependency 92,31 % 
NIH-syndrome              84,62 % 
Lockout 84,62 % 
Lock-in 84,62 % 
Inertia 84,62 % 
Flexibility 7,69 % 
Risk-Taking 7,69 % 
Experimentation 7,69 % 
Figure 12: Innovation challenges 
considered by informants interviewed 
in Florence. 
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8.1.1 Path dependency, Lock-in, Lockout, Inertia and NIH-syndrome 
Path dependency transpires from a history of technology development from a longer period. 
Lock-in appears out of different reinforcing effects and lockout occurs when the costs of 
changing paths becomes too vast. An informant describes the shift in focus on technology 
development within the oil and gas sector:  
 
As of today, I have no doubt that our greatest challenge is to bring down our costs, become more efficient 
and get the same output to a lower price. This challenge involves largely the way we work towards external 
suppliers and external partners (…) Not many months ago the industry were unaware that costs would have so 
much importance, and only volume and time were relevant for innovation and technology development (ST1, 
17.02.14). 
 
Informant ST1 from Statoil implies that the sector has been locked into a technology path driven 
by increasingly higher costs and inefficient innovation and technology development. 
Furthermore, he describes this path to be reinforced when Statoil perform innovation 
collaboration with suppliers and stakeholders. ST1 comprises the main challenges GOT IA try 
to address in this technology-sharing platform. 
According to the values presented in Figure 12, informants interviewed under the GOT 
IA meeting in Florence have identified path dependent behavior as a major challenge to 
innovation selection. One of the objectives with the GOT IA is to develop selection principles 
to reduce costs on innovation and to open up a new technology path. This informant shares a 
this view:  
 
My hope is that between these organizations, from all over the world and from different sectors, we will 
be able to do things that can accelerate R&D spending on technologies that are environmentally important. 
Furthermore to help drive down costs, spread awareness on technology and best practices that already exist and 
could and should have a higher adoption rate and a penetration rate (C3L, 09.04.14).  
  
This informant identifies a number of steps where GOT IA can affect technology development 
in the oil and gas sector. He emphasizes that in the competing technology path, R&D 
expenditures are used to develop environmental friendly technologies. The oil and gas sector 
has experienced lockout from this path because reinforcing effects, like innovation 
collaboration with suppliers and environmental disasters like Macondo, have been driving up 
the costs and risks. Accordingly, informant C3L is optimistic that GOT IA may enhance 
technology that can reduce CO2 emissions and enable entry into the competing technology path. 
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At the same time, he means that the GOT IA is a selection principle to spread existing 
technology and not to develop radical innovations with technology from a new technology path. 
Rather, he emphasizes that GOT IA can be a method to spread the current technology to other 
companies and actors internationally.  
NIH-syndrome and open innovation recognize external knowledge flows from 
competency outside the core area of expertise to affect innovation selection by enabling the 
decision maker to identify promising radical innovation initiatives. Another informant shares 
the argument that GOT IA can affect technology and innovation by increasing awareness of 
new technology: «I believe that perhaps the most important thing GOT IA can do is to take 
existing knowledge, put it together, analyse it and communicate it in a better way» (C3M, 
09.04.14). This informant, like the former, identifies GOT IA as a tool to counter innovation 
challenges by spreading the word of existing technology. Furthermore, informant C3M seems 
to believe that GOT IA may affect the selection of incremental innovations instead of 
facilitating radical innovations.  
The researcher experienced while observing the informants and participating in a 
workshop on clean and safe hydrocarbons, that the main focus in the discussions was not to 
develop radical innovations by utilizing technology outside the current technology path. The 
informants seemed to be reluctant to engage in innovation initiatives that could revolutionize 
the industry and decrease CO2 emissions and other greenhouse gases to a minimum. On the one 
hand, the informants identified the sector as extremely path dependent. On the other hand, they 
expressed a desire to start with implementing current technology and increase their performance 
through incremental innovation. Inherently, inertia can be a vast innovation challenge to 
facilitate radical innovations and it is considered a vast innovation challenge in Figure 12. 
According to the theory on open innovation, GOT IA has a number of elements to 
counter the challenges for innovation selection described in Figure 12 and Figure 4. The theory 
on open innovation considers variation and knowledge sharing to foster the selection of the 
most viable and promising innovation initiatives and informant C3A describes GOT IA like 
this:  
 
It is a way of sharing what is going on across multiple sectors around the world, so that North Sea 
operations in Norway can learn about operations based on American experience. Perhaps some technology can 
be applicable to the North Sea – and vice versa. The Gulf of Mexico may need technology from the North Sea 
(C3A, 08.04.14). 
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Informant C3A emphasizes a pattern: The GOT IA is an excellent tool to spread knowledge 
and technology on an international scale. It is unique in this sense and may counter path 
dependent behavior, NIH-syndrome, lock-in and lockout that are vast challenges to the 
selection of innovations. Furthermore, it may be an important mechanism to enhance the 
potential of radical innovations in the existing technology landscape40. However, there seems 
to an element in inertia to develop radical innovations based on technology outside the current 
trajectory. If this challenge can be countered, GOT IA has potential to facilitate the selection of 
radical innovations solving.   
8.1.2 Flexibility, Taking Risk and Experimenting 
In the objective of creating GOT lies an ambition of taking risks and experimenting with 
technology that the industry currently has not been enable to do by itself:  
 
GOT is an opportunity to create a strategic vision for technologies by dealing with problems that are a 
little further down the road than a specific business man today would be able to invest in by himself. Through 
GOT he or she can take a little bit of risk for a long-term gain (GE16, 08.04.14).  
 
Informant GE16 adresses GOT as an opportunity to address the major problems striking the 
conservative and path-dependent oil and gas sector. In addition, informants from Figure 12 
values the industry as not especially willing to take risks, experiment or flexible in terms of 
innovation selection. One informant, however, perceives commercial companies in the oil and 
gas sector adept at finding technical solutions:  
 
Will it continue to be economical profitable, accounting for the associated costs related to climate change, 
health issues and so on that comes with the production and consumption of hydrocarbons? From a commercial 
point of view, I do not think there are any high risks because I think the companies will be highly adapt at finding 
solutions (C3H, 09.04.14).  
 
Informant C3H emphasizes high costs and risk-aversion as the main challenge facing the 
industry. In addition, competing energy suppliers may develop technology enabling them to 
deliver cheaper and cleaner energy. The theoretical framework implies that a balanced 
innovation portfolio with incremental and radical innovations gives higher ROI. Furthermore, 
                                                 
40 These are described in chapter 2.1.1. 
94 
 
tight collaboration with stakeholders41, in addition to interaction with policy makers42 is 
emphasized to reduce risk and enable the selection of radical innovations. In addition, the 
knowledgebase of experts GOT IA can provide experimentation and flexibility. An 
organization that has succeeded in developing revolutionzing innovations is DARPA43. The 
agreement gathers extremely talented people to collaborate and deliver break-through 
innovation on a short time scope. A top manager says this about DARPA: 
 
GE and Statoil have the possibility to create combined superteams with extremely skilled people trained 
to collaborate. A problem for these types of collaborations are IP. Therefore you need a bulletproof agreement 
dealing with all terms and conditions and establish the rules that take of all the hinders innovation collaboration 
may encounter e.g. ownership (ST4, 06.03.14).  
 
Informant ST4 implies vast difficulties to implement a DRAPA-like agreement on an inter-
organizational level. In he identifies institutional factors as necessary to facilitate the selection 
of radical innovations. The analysis suggests that if the GOT IA can impose the creation of 
superteams with the extremely talented people who are already attending. Furthermore by 
creating rules induces risk-taking, experimentation and flexibility, the GOT IA may have the 
potential to fulfill its ambitious objectives and develop successful radical innovations.  
Summary 
 Inertia is a threat to facilitate radical innovations, which is suprising since no 
other innovation challenges is found in the analysis. Inertia can be overcome 
through implementing institutional factors opening for variation in knowledge 
and competencies into GOT IA. One way to achieve variation is to invite 
organizations from other industies to counter and consequently increase the 
potentital of selecting successful radical innovations.  
 
 GOT IA has a design that reduces risk and enable experimentation and 
flexibility. The analysis unveils that these innovation factors are lacking, and 
that implementing institutional factors based on the DARPA-recipe may be an 
                                                 
41 According to the literature on open innovation. 
42 According to the literature on institutionalism. 
43 Presented in chapter 3.5. 
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inducement mechanism to develop radical innovations revolutionzing the 
industry. 
 
8.2 Macro institutional analysis: Vast challenges and 
major opportunities 
The innovation analysis indicates that GOT IA has reasonable good chances to facilitate radical 
innovations. Developing new policy implications are a main objective with the GOT IA, and 
institutional factors are closely intertwined with inertia – the main innovation challenge to 
innovation selection. Policy makers, governments and makers of international standards 
participates on the agreement implying that GOT IA has the potential to use macro institutional 
factors to induce innovations in the oil and gas sector. GE Oil and Gas as the operating agent 
behind the agreement, stands in an ideal position if they can use this to their advantage; Creating 
innovations that meet institutional requirements, solve commercial problems and influence key 
decision makers in all parts of the supply chain. Figure 13 present an overview where 
informants on the third case study value macro institutional to strongly affect innovation 
selection. Formal institutional factors, regulations and laws have been valued the highest. 
Therefore the analysis starts with these factors. 
 
Figure 13: Overall value score per macro institutional factor from informants on the third case study. 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Communicating with the local community
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Agreements
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Laws
Regulations
Overall value score per macro institutional factor from informants 
on the third case study
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8.2.1 Regulations, Laws, Agreements and Forums 
Macro institutionalism presented in chapter 3.3.1 says that institutional factors can affect 
innovation selection in commercial companies because they outline regulations in the favor of 
some companies and to the disadvantage for others. GOT IA is a formal agreement where some 
organizations sign a document and undertakes specific responsibilities related to innovation and 
technology development. It is also an informal forum where policy makers and those companies 
who have to comply with these regulations can meet and discuss how they can collaborate to 
develop innovation initiatives dealing with the global energy challenges facing the world. 
Informant C3G describes the global challenges: 
 
The Gas and Oil Technology Initiative is a collaborative dialogue vehicle involving policymakers, 
governments, companies and research organizations who operates around the world. (…) The GOT collaboration 
addresses collective ways to accelerate technology that needs to be developed to meet the huge growth in global 
energy demand ahead and which at the same time enables oil and gas to be a part of a long term sustainable 
energy future (C3G, 08.04.14). 
 
One of the main objectives with the GOT IA is to contribute to a technology gap and addressing 
this through radical innovation initiatives can be an opportunity. Furthermore, the informal tie 
GOT IA creates may benefit the attendees, since they can address laws and regulations in the 
best interest of their own technology development and innovation. For GE Oil and Gas, who is 
the operating agent, the theory on institutionalism distincintly indicates that GOT IA can 
provide significant benefits. GE Oil and Gas can use the forum to interact with policy makers. 
potential customers and influence how the industry develop technology in a long-term 
perspective. Furthermore, as an operating agent they can redeem information inaccessible from 
competitors which could give them increased knowledge and a competitive advantage in the 
selection of innovations. GOT IA is still in the premature days, but if the forum manages to 
realize its potential GE Oil and Gas has a unique opportunity to reduce institutional risks, 
benefit from direct interaction with kay stake holders facilitating the selection of successful 
radical innovations. 
  Figure 13 presents an overview where informants from this case study values formal 
factors, laws and regulations, to strongly affect the selection of innovation initiatives in their 
respective companies. The Figure supports data presented in Figure 10 where laws and 
regulations are valued to strongly affect innovation selection. However, a discrepancy can be 
found in the relationship of how agreements and informal forums affect innovation selection. 
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Informants interviewed on this case study value forums and agreements as more important to 
innovation selection than the average presented in Figure 10. The reason may be that GOT IA 
itself is an informal forum and a formal agreement and that informants may have a stronger 
incentive to value this as an important tie since they are already attending.  
The agreement is an opportunity to use a collective approach for the creation of policy 
implications enhancing technology development associated to high risk. Furthermore, GOT IA 
can build a new direction for technology development aiming to consider high costs to new 
technology development, reducing risks to invest in sustainable solutions improving the 
position of fossil fuels in the future energy landscape on a long-term.  
On the one hand, GOT IA can be used to make new policy implications. On the other 
hand, GOT IA can also be a forum to discuss existing policies, because policies may also hinder 
companies to engage in innovation. A top manager from API expresses his view to how GOT 
IA will affect technology and innovation in the industry:  
 
Well, the major challenge we face across the board is access to resources. Regulations that can severely 
change our business base, and you know, some of the other ones such are tax issues. Everyone wants to tax the 
industry – even though there is no real good case for it (C3I, 09.04.14). 
 
Informant C3I addresses that public regulations can severely change how companies in the oil 
and gas industry conducts business, and he asserts that tax regulations and concessions can 
severely affect the ability a company has to pool resources into innovation. Resource constraints 
is identified as a major challenge to innovation selection in the PPM literature, consequently 
GOT IA can reduce risks of innovation and technology development. Furthermore, the citation 
from informant C3I supports the theoretical proposition that laws and regulations may be an 
obstacle to innovation. He enhances that tax regulations affects innovation strongly, and 
perhaps this is an incentive that could be discussed to enable the selection of radical innovation 
initiatives. The proposition that these macro institutional factors affect innovation selection is 
confirmed, but the future direction of the GOT IA decide to what extent they will affect 
innovation selection. 
8.2.2 Time 
Time is valued to strongly affect how companies select innovation initiatives in Figure 13. 
Throughout the thesis, time has turned up as a challenge for innovation and technology 
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development. GOT IA is identified as selection principle that can reduce the risks this 
institutional factor may have on innovation selection. A top manager explains how he sees the 
GOT IA in terms of time perspective:  
 
I think collaboration can affect how the large companies and organizations consider the future 
opportunities and possibilities to use innovation more efficiently in a longer perspective. I think this can enhance 
R&D efforts in the industry in a longer perspective (C3J, 09.04.14). 
 
Informant C3J identifies GOT IA as a principle tool addressing the focus upon technology 
development and innovation in a longer perspective. It is acknowledged that it can be inherently 
difficult to succeed with radical innovation when this is based upon technology from a 
competing technology path, since it usually require a long-term commitment. From the value 
score time received in Figure 13, it can be deduced that the companies who attended the meeting 
in Florence are aware of these difficulties. Consequently, time is a factor that has a strong effect 
on innovation selection – and the GOT IA is a selection principle that can use its benefit of 
addressing long-term perspectives as a reason for facilitating radical innovations. 
8.2.3 Corruption and Public Perception 
Public perception and corruption are informal macro institutional factors that directly affects 
the behavior of policy makers and decision makers in companies. How the public perceives the 
use of hydrocarbon resources is one of the main challenges facing the oil and gas industry. 
Furthermore, public awareness oil spills and greenhouse gas emissions may increase resistance 
towards non-renewable sources of energy supply. Public perception is only to some extent 
enhanced in Figure 13 to affect the selection of innovation initiatives. The technologies sought 
to be developed on the GOT IA can involve initiatives with the potential to reduce 
environmental issues related to oil and gas exploration. Radical technologies may change the 
public perception in favour of fossil fuels, and therefore this factor affects the selection of 
innovation initatives.  
Corruption is an informal factor that may have major implications for the outcome of 
future ROI on innovations. Major global concessions and or incentives in respect to the 
implementation of new “green” energy sources and the restrictions that may be imposed upon 
the Oil & Gas Industry, enormous pressure may be placed upon political persons in influential 
positions in the decision making process. This creates a situation where the financial stakes and 
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potential loss or benefits are so great, that corruption may be used to influence politicians and 
government officials. Corruption is not emphasized to strongly affect innovation initatives in 
Figure 13. The reason may be that corruption is more common in developing countries where 
the normal level of earnings in that country increases the temptation for corruption in positions 
of authority (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Currently, participants in the GOT IA come from 
governments, organizations and firms from emerging economies or developed countries. 
Therefore, corruption is not on the agenda. However this factor may increase its influence on 
innovation in the future.  
8.2.4 Local Conditions, Creating Local Content and Communicating with 
the local community 
Local conditions, creation of local content and communication with the local community have 
received a low value score in Figure 13. Furthermore, these macro institutional factors were not 
emphasized in the agreement. In addition, only a few informants mentioned these factors as the 
major challenges facing the industry. GOT IA is directed towards oil and gas producing 
companies. The founding countries behind the agreement are industrialized countries, and 
perhaps these factors would be on the agenda if countries with high institutional risk were 
involved in the agreement as well. 
Summary 
 The GOT IA is an informal forum and a formal agreement to discuss macro institutional 
factors and perform technology collaboration. By involving more participant countries 
it can gain recognition in order to become a global platform for technology sharing. 
Furthermore, this is important to deal with the institutional factors, corruption, public 
perception and local content, which is not targeted by the agreement today.  
 
 
 The GOT IA has the ability to address long-term challenges with policy implictions 
towards law-makers. Laws and regulations affect how companies select innovation 
initatives. By addressing policy facilitating radical innovations aimed at reducing costs 
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and enhacing clean and safe operations, GE Oil and Gas can increase the potential of 
succeeding with radical innovations.    
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9 Concluding chapter 
 
This thesis has analyzed how innovation factors (challenges and opportunities) and institutional 
factors affect the selection of innovation initiatives. The thesis proposes that institutional 
factors, formal and informal, strongly affect the selection of innovation initiatives in three 
embedded case studies. A three level qualitative analysis, intra-organizational, inter-
organizational and macro-institutional, of how institutional factors have affected the selection 
of innovations have been conducted through interviews, observations and documents.  
This case study has investigated how GE Oil and Gas collaborates with customers and 
stakeholders. By doing so, the study has strived to understand how GE Oil and Gas can facilitate 
the selection of radical innovations. The theoretical framework explored the selection of radical 
innovations with a high risk of failure and argued that increased knowledge on institutional 
factors and innovation could reduce risk and facilitate successful radical innovations. A radical 
innovation leads to significant changes in the sector, and a main objective has been to 
investigate how technology can solve major challenges facing the oil and gas industry. By 
developing cost effective and environmental-friendly solutions, GE Oil and Gas can increase 
commercial viability and gain a competitive advantage on other suppliers.  
 
1. What affects the selection of innovation initiatives at GE Oil and Gas, and how can 
these selection principles facilitate radical innovations?  
The analysis of innovation factors indicates that GE Oil and Gas holds the opportunity to select 
and succeed with radical innovation initiatives. Compared to external partners analysed in this 
thesis, the company is willing to take risks and experiment with new technology. Furthermore, 
the analysis reveals that GE Oil and Gas is less path dependent and more open to change, both 
of which are prerequisites for the selection of radical innovation initiatives. However, the 
company faces a few innovation challenges that may indicate why GE Oil and Gas has been 
unsuccessful in introducing radical innovations.  
Internally, the focus of acquiring technology companies transpiring from path 
dependency has created challenges to innovation collaboration. The newly acquired companies 
have been reluctant to share their technologies and have resisted the selection principles GE Oil 
and Gas use to select innovation initiatives. Furthermore, the analysis reveals that the Macondo 
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accident has increased inertia in the oil and gas sector, and reinforcing a lockout-effect to 
experiment with technology from competing paths. In addition, this has created a lock-in effect 
where the risk of failure and high costs is seen as a hinder to succeed with the selection of 
radical innovations. Finally, the lack of flexibility and rigid structure of the selection principles 
GE Oil and Gas use to consider innovation initiatives is a challenge to select radical innovation 
initiatives. The analysis concludes that these innovation challenges alone are not the hinder for 
the selection of radical innovations at GE Oil and Gas. The analysis proposes that formal and 
informal institutional factors strongly affect how GE Oil and Gas selects innovation initiatives 
and use this as a starting point for a three level institutional analysis.  
 
Proposition: Institutional Factors will strongly affect the selection of innovations in 
GE Oil and Gas 
The analysis implicates that the selection principles GE Oil and Gas applies, enable dynamic 
technology discussions based on trust and open communication within GE, between GE and 
the external partner and between GE and organizations on a government level. Consequently, 
informal institutional factors on all three levels affect the selection of innovations and create 
ties that induces the selection of radical innovations. However, despite these implications, GE 
Oil and Gas encounters major obstacles to successfully implement and succeed with innovation 
initiatives.  
On the intra-organizational level the main obstacle to facilitate the selection of radical 
innovations are insufficient formal routines for cross-sectional innovation collaboration. GE 
stands in a unique position to access several types of technologies from their internal research 
centers and utilize competency from a wide array of intra-organizational business to innovation 
projects. However, obstacles arise when employees aims to engage in cross-sectional 
collaboration. In-effective and complicated routines delay innovation projects. In addition, each 
business unit has their own profit and loss budget excluding innovations running across several 
business units. The analysis reveals that innovation projects tend to become under-prioritized 
despite top-management support. Furthermore, insufficient formal routines to facilitate 
effective cross-sectional collaboration is the biggest bottleneck to facilitate radical innovations. 
Lengthy negotiations on terms and conditions with customers and stringent selection 
principles are the greatest impediments to the selection of innovation initiatives on the inter-
organizational level. If GE Oil and Gas can leverage from the informal relationships with 
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external partners and spend more resources to receive the customer’s approval to qualify new 
technology, the selection principles could facilitate radical innovations with a high potential to 
succeed. Furthermore, formalizing the business case into a selection principle would increase 
recognition of innovation initiatives and aligning interests from both companies to succeed with 
radical innovations. In addition, this could help drive radical innovations through the internal 
organization at both companies. 
The macro-level analysis reveals that local conditions in a country can affect the 
selection of innovations at GE Oil and Gas. Furthermore, the analysis reveals that as a supplier, 
GE Oil and Gas would prioritize the creation of local content when this is a requirement from 
the customer. However, when going into a developing country, GE Oil and Gas does not spend 
vast resources to counter the high risks of failure unstable and unpredictable institutional factors 
constitute for innovations. The analysis implies that increased attention to create compliance 
programs and a closer interaction with the local population can ease the introduction of 
innovation initiatives aimed at new countries. Laws and regulations affect the selection of 
innovations at GE Oil and Gas strongly. Policies can reduce risk of failure or create obstacles 
directly affecting the facilitation of radical innovations. The analysis reveals that a collective 
approach between commercial organizations, NGO’s and governments seem to be a viable 
approach to develop radical innovations with a potential to solve the major challenges facing 
the oil and gas industry. Consequently, innovation factors and institutional factors strongly 
affect the selection of innovation initiatives at GE Oil and Gas. Furthermore, they are closely 
intertwined, and improvements to formal institutional factors seems counter innovation 
challenges and increase opportunities to facilitate radical innovation selection at GE Oil and 
Gas. 
 
2. How can GE Oil and Gas increase the potential to succeed with radical 
innovations? 
 
The analysis implicates that formal institutional factors on all three levels strongly affect the 
potential to succeed with radical innovation initiatives at GE Oil and Gas. The analysis reveals 
that companies who fails to succeed with radical innovation initiatives at times where 
innovation factors are not the main challenge to innovation selection, can facilitate successful 
radical innovations by improving their formal selection principles. Improvement occurs by 
strengthening formal principles through the allocation of resources (time, personnel and 
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money), removing time-consuming bottlenecks for innovation and setting the priorities to select 
and succeed with radical innovations. Creating a selection principle enhancing commercial 
interests of involved parties into a separate Funnel for radical ideas was suggested to increase 
the potential of radical ideas at GE Oil and Gas. Finally, the thesis implicates that implementing 
these measures will enhance the unique position of GE Oil and Gas to develop radical 
technology solving some of the challenges facing the oil and gas industry. 
9.2 Limitations and implications for further research 
This case study is limited since the institutional factors were analyzed separately and then 
combined into a three level analysis from three embedded case studies. Going into detail on 
all three embedded case studies would have strengthened the implications. Furthermore, 
examining the implications to how GE Oil and Gas could increase its potential by 
implementing improvements suggested in the previous chapter could have been interesting for 
further research. 
I deliberately chose to limit the institutional analysis on each embedded case study in order to 
gain insights and data on all three levels. A master thesis has tight time scope and limited 
space. Therefore, it was considered to be out of the scope of this thesis to perform an in-depth 
three level analysis on each embedded case study. 
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Audit diary. 
 
 
 
Date Problem Decision Approach Consequence
September 2013
Lack of knowledge regarding 
innovation selection in 
commercial firms.
Conduct an internet survey to 
increase insights to 
innovation selection in 
commercial firms.
Call large firms who perform 
innovation or R&D in Norway 
and ask if they can answer the 
internet survey.
17 firms completed an internet 
survey with 18 questions.
October 2013
Identify empirical objects 
relevant for a case-study
Wanted to include 4 firms 
from various sectors to do a 
comparative case study.
Use the Internet Survey and the 
personal network to approach 
firms. 
Visited 4 firms including GE Oil 
and Gas .
October 2013
Agreed on an engagement to 
conduct a case study on GE Oil 
and Gas and therefore I had to 
change the research strategy.
Modify research questions 
and theoretical chapter to a 
single case design with three 
embedded units.
I performed an extencive 
literature review to elaborate on 
the new topic and engaged in 
document analysis to increase 
my contextual understanding.
I was behind schedule 
compared to the original 
strategy.
December 2013 Accessing informants
Use the interview as the main 
source of data and key 
informants for help regarding 
interview design and access 
to interview objects.
Snow-balling and Criterion-
Sampling
25 informants were interviewed 
on the first two case studies. 
The high number of informants 
enhanced validity. Help from 
key informants with interview 
design improved reliability.
December/January
Time to write methodology 
chapter before engaging in data 
collection.
Write draft and complete the 
chapter as soon as possible 
since the methods was 
critical to learn before 
untaking research.
First draft finished in January. 
Completed the chapter in 
February.
Enhanced the quality of my 
thesis regarding validity and 
reliability. 
January 2014 Data Collection Strategy
Ask for signed consent, record 
all  interviews and then 
transcribe the data material. 
Complement the strategy with 
documentation and 
observation.
The first interview was 
conducted in the end of January 
and the last interview was 
conducted on the 2nd of May. 
Observations were conducted on 
occasions in between the 
interviews.
Time consuming, but extremely 
useful and eased coding of 
data.
April  2014
Data Collection Stategy on the 
third case study with a short 
time scope.
Perform participant 
observation and short 
interviews.
Participants were informed 
about my presence. Initatied 
interviews myself.
13 interviews, document 
material and observations of 
informants in their natural 
environment. Triangulation 
enhanced quality.
April  2014
Coding of Data on a tight time 
scope
Stay put to the original 
strategy despite l ittle time.
Read-through - coloring - 
awarding points and identifying 
patterns and trends.
47 Codes
April  2014
Data Analysis and Visualization 
on a short time scope and lack 
of pages in my thesis.
Conduct a l imited 
institutional analysis, but 
complete an innovation 
analysis across all  three case-
studies.
Started with the TCA, then 
Tanzania and the GOT IA
Managed to finish in time, but I 
wa sunable to conduct a three 
level institutional analysis on 
all  three case-studies.
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Interview Guide 1 
On external institutional and cultural risk: 
Can you please tell me about your current position in GE? 
• Prompt: How is your work related to risk management on innovation projects? 
1. How does GE Oil and Gas (or Statoil) adapt when you enter a new 
geographical market? Do you lean on experience from the GE Corporation?  
2. Do you think there are parts of GE that has technology more relevant for this 
project? 
 Prompt: Do you think you will take advantage of experience or knowledge from 
business areas or departments of GE in this particular project? 
3. What do you think are the biggest challenges for receiving ROI on technical 
exploration projects in Tanzania? 
 Then show the informant the country profile, explain the results and ask for 
comments. 
4.  Do you take these challenges into account when you select innovation 
projects? How important would you say that these challenges are on ROI for technical 
exploration projects? 
 Prompt: Do you include this perspective into your risk assessments for technical 
exploration projects? 
5. In general, do you think that oil and gas companies have learned from their experience 
with similar challenges in Nigeria?  
 
 Prompt: What steps have do you mean have been taken to meet these environmental 
and cultural challenges in Tanzania? 
Interview guide 2  
On collaboration activities with GE Oil and Gas. 
1. Could you please tell me about your current position at Statoil? 
 Prompt: Can you elaborate on your responsibilities towards GE Oil and Gas please? 
2. What parts of the customer relationship between GE Oil and Gas and Statoil is working 
well from your point of view? Why do you think that is? 
 Prompt: On what areas do you see room for improvement? 
3. How often do you interact with GE Oil and Gas through emails, meetings or phone calls? 
 Prompt: Do you find it easy to communicate with GE Oil and Gas employees? 
4. What does Statoil expect from an international company like GE Oil and Gas? 
 Could you elaborate on what you relate to the concept a “One GE”? 
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5. Do you have agreements with Statoil that facilitate an increased number of technically 
radical innovation projects? 
6. Do GE and Statoil engage in types of collaboration where other companies or organizations 
participate? 
7. When would you choose a cheaper technical solution with proven technology that has 
never been used commercially before a current, but more expensive, solution? 
8. Do you think that technically radical innovation projects will be developed? 
 Prompt: Are you under the impression that Statoil require technical radical solutions in 
the sense that they can solve challenges where existing solutions are insufficient? 
9. Are you under the impression that Statoil is open to new technical solutions suggested by 
GE? 
 Prompt: Does this differ from other customers? Why do you think that is? 
 
Interview guide 3 
 
TCA specific questions: 
 
1.What is the aim of the current TCA? 
 
2.One of the goals of the TCA is to create “new solutions” and to “move mountains”. From 
your point of view, how can the next TCA facilitate successful radical innovation projects? 
 
3.What is your opinion on introducing new ideas to the TCA if the idea is based on 
technology from other business areas in GE? 
 Prompt: What are the main challenges for introducing new technology to the TCA? 
(Note to self: Not Invented here syndrome, Path Dependency, Lock-In, Resistance to 
change) 
 
4. Do you think the TCA opens up for the selection of innovation projects associated to high 
risk? 
 Prompt: Compared to how you work with innovation on a regular basis: Do you think 
the TCA encourage experimentation? 
 
5. What kind of routines do you have for collaboration between Statoil and GE Oil and Gas? 
 Prompt: Does the TCA have any special routines that differ from the overall 
collaboration activities? 
 
6. On which areas do you see room for improvement on the TCA between Statoil and GE Oil 
and Gas?  
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Interview guide 4 
On internal institutional and cultural factors in GE Oil and Gas 
1. Please tell me about your current position at GE.  
Prompt: For how long have you been working here?  
2. What type of training did you receive when you started working at GE? 
Prompt: Did you have the opportunity courses and training on areas outside your expertise or 
competency since you started working here 
3. How does the bonus system at GE work regarding risk? From your point of view, 
would this encourage risk-taking and experimentation regarding the type of innovation 
projects you would be prone to select? 
4. Do you think employees at GE exploit the potential of technology developed at GRC 
when they work with innovation projects? 
5. How does communication between GRC and GE occur?  
Prompt: What areas would you say are working well? What areas would you say need room 
for improvement? How do you think this can be achieved?  
6. From your point of view, as an employee at GE Oil and Gas, do you have the flexibility 
to experiment with radical technology?  
Prompt: Do you have clear routines on where you can find cooperation partners? 
Prompt: Would you say that risk-taking on innovation projects differ regardless of type of 
innovation projects developed? 
7. What is your impression on communication procedures across different business areas 
when working on an innovation project?  
Prompt: What areas would you say are working well? What areas would you say need room 
for improvement? How do you think this can be achieved?  
8. When undertaking innovation projects, do you fell that GE has clear routines for 
cooperation across business areas. How do you develop new ideas across business 
areas within GE? 
9. Prompt: Would you say that cooperation across business areas encourages or 
discourages radical innovation projects? Please elaborate.  
Interview guide 5 
Name:  
1. Position and organization:  
2. Why have your organization committed itself to the GOT IA? 
3. From your point of view, what are the major challenges that the 
4. In what way do you think the GOTIA will affect innovation and technology 
development within the oil and gas sector? 
5. Do you think the agreement also deals with long-term challenges? 
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